


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CONTENTS

29 November 1991

BULGARIA

Information on BSP Coalition Partners Presented [DUMA 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Oct]	1
Leaders, Members of Legislative Commission	7
More Replacements for National Representatives [DURZHAVEN VESTNIK 15 Nov]	7
New Taxation Administration Described [IKONOMICHESTKI ZHIVOT 2 Oct]	7

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Hexagonal Association in Nutshell [DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED No 42]	9
Political Impact of Danube Dam Controversy Weighed [Paris LE MONDE 8 Nov]	9
OH Submits Specific Language for Referendum [INFORUM 26 Sep]	10
Slovak Columnist Ponicka on Common State [MLADA FRONTA DNES 29 Oct]	11
Affirmation of Democracy Seen as Rationale [LIDOVE NOVINY 1 Nov]	12
Czech Daily's Commentary on Bratislava Incident [LIDOVE NOVINY 29 Oct]	13
Indigenous Gypsies in Statistics [DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED No 41]	13
Confederation Seen Advantageous for Slovak Economy [LITERARNY TYZDENNIK 11 Oct]	15

HUNGARY

Csurka on Coalition Talks, His Role in MDF [TALLOZO 24 Oct]	19
Sponsor of Political Retribution Law Interviewed [NEPSZABADSAG 29 Oct]	20
Judicial Independence Guarantees Found Wanting [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 2 Nov]	22
Emigres on Dangers of Nuclear Plant Expansion [KAPU Oct]	23

POLAND

German Claims to Former Land Holdings in Gorzow [WPROST 15 Sep]	25
Ukrainian Rukh Presents Plans, Program [TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY 13 Oct]	25
History, Nationalism at Eastern Border Examined [WPROST 6 Sep]	28
Parliamentary Elections: Losers, Winners Reviewed [POLITYKA 9 Nov]	31
Sejm Deputies Listed by Party Affiliation [GAZETA WYBORCZA 31 Oct-1 Nov]	32
Election Assessment: Extreme Right, Left Win [GLOS PORANNY 2-3 Nov]	36
Overview of Economy for First Three Quarters [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Oct]	37
Trade With USSR Seen To Be Promising [RZECZPOSPOLITA 14 Oct]	38
Commission Founded for Cooperation With Italy [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Oct]	39
Rising Cost of Beets Raises Sugar Price [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Oct]	39
Record Year for Telecommunications Predicted [RZECZPOSPOLITA 16 Oct]	40

ROMANIA

Justice Minister on Combating Corruption [CURIERUL NATIONAL 31 Oct]	42
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YUGOSLAVIA

Slovene-Italian Border Problems Reopened [DELO 8 Nov]	43
Recognition of Slovenia Expected in 2 Months [DELO 8 Nov]	43
National, Christian Democrats Review Cooperation [DELO 8 Nov]	44

Information on BSP Coalition Partners Presented

92BA0063A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 Oct 91

[Unattributed article in five installments on the Bulgarian Socialist Party coalition partners]

[7 Oct p 4]

[Text]

The Christian Republican Party

The Christian Republican Party (KhRP) was founded on 16 December 1989 in Plovdiv by 62 founding members from Plovdiv, Sofia, Septemvri, Pazardzhik, Berkovitsa, Khisarya, Radomir, Dimitrovgrad, and Poroyna Village. Some were members of the Club for Support of Glasnost and Restructuring, the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights, and the Podkrepa Independent Trade Union.

The Christian Republican Party is an Anglo-Saxon-type party—without membership cards or membership dues. It does not accept the concept of "membership mass." Members of the party are people engaged in politics and in organizational activities needed in political work.

The General Conference is the supreme authority of the KhRP. Oblast, township, and rayon secretariats will be established in the local areas to maintain contacts in the name of the party on their respective levels.

The KhRP is represented by a national secretariat, whose chairman is Konstantin Adzharov. Rumen Yanakiev is its general representative, Elisaveta Milenova its spokesperson, Violeta Stankova its secretary, and Simeon Pavlov its treasurer.

The objective of the Christian Republican Party is to earn the trust of the voters and assume its share of responsibility in the administration of the country. The party opposes violence. It is for legality and order and believes that democracy cannot be built by undemocratic means. It considers the opposition not as the enemy but as a necessary partner of the government.

The KhRP is in favor of private farming in the development of agriculture. Its members believe that the question of land is not simply a juridical problem but also a matter of a purely economic nature. The party is in favor of privatization and of rescinding the tax on turnover and replacing it with a tax on profits. In favors a flexible banking policy.

The KhRP's view on the national problem is the following: "There can be no free individuals without private property, and there can be no nation without free individuals." The Christian Republicans are in favor of discarding the staff carried by beggars rather than threatening our neighbors with it.

The KhRP favors the gradual conversion to a highly trained professional army, functioning with honor and

dignity in the spirit of Bulgarian traditions: staying out of politics, remaining loyal to the Fatherland, and defending the weak.

The party's symbol is the lark.

* * *

For a Common Bulgarian Home

—by Konstantin Adzharov, chairman of the Christian Republican Party

Recently, the daughter of friends of mine said, "Tell me something about the opposition because I shall shortly begin work as a parliamentary journalist and I have very little information." I told her that no one really knew and that it would be absurd to try to shed some light on this matter in the time that it takes to drink a cup of coffee after dinner.

Now once again I am faced with a similar request, this time from DUMA: "Why are you part of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] coalition?"

My counterquestion would be, "Why is the BSP part of an electoral alliance with another seven parties?" This leads to the following answer: When a political force decides to pursue not narrow party interests but national ones, it realizes that it cannot do this alone. The fact that the BSP has realized this clearly proves that it is truly changing. I can see this every single day, as I meet with the voters who sincerely aspire to achieve a national consensus. Our coalition is unprecedented in Eastern Europe, and the explanation for its appearance can be only one: Bulgaria remains Bulgaria.

You may ask how is it that we Christian Republicans have reached that point and whether we have betrayed something. We have not. Ever since it was founded on 2 November 1989, the KhRP has systematically pursued a centrist policy. On 24 November 1989, we called for extraordinary parliamentary elections, and, on 12 December, we stated that the solution lies in the creation of a broad coalition government. An attempt of this nature was made one year later, but by then we were poorer by one year.

Until the elections for the Grand National Assembly were held, our political stage was multicolored but was presented schematically as the struggle between the former BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and the "opposition." The fact that there were 30 different political parties that campaigned independently in the elections, which means that they were opposed not only to the BSP but also to all other parties, eloquently refuted such schematism.

What we claimed then we claim again: Opposition means a parliamentary minority. We cannot speak of opposition before the parliamentary elections. Until the electoral results have been announced, there simply are political forces. They may be regrouped according to their interpretation of the wishes of the electorate.

Why do we want our electoral alliance to win? Because Bulgaria needs political stability, and such stability can be achieved only with a parliamentary majority coalition. This will be a reliable support of a coalition government. To speak of any other type of government in the current circumstances would not be serious.

In conclusion, let me say this: We must build a common Bulgarian home. Only then can we become a worthy partner of a United Europe.

Explanation by *Who's Who* Editors

Allow us to present, with a special feeling of sympathy, our apologies to Mr. Konstantin Adzharov, the president of the Christian Republican Party, as well as to the readers of *Who's Who in Elections '91* and to the leaders, parties, coalitions, and alliances for the annoying technical error that was made in the English translation of the party's name (page 100 of the book): Instead of giving it its right name, Christian Republican Party, we called it the Christian Democratic Party (CBP).

We sincerely hope that Mr. Adzharov will accept the apologies of Sofiya Todorova, the responsible editor, and Eva Ralchevska, the translator. We can prove to the reader that it is a question of a technical error by directing him to page 11 of the book, where, in the table of contents given in English, he will find, in reference to page 100, the correct appellation "Christian Republican Party."

[8 Oct p 4]

[Text]

Christian Women's Movement

The Christian Women's Movement (KhZhD) was founded on 11 October 1990 as an offshoot of the Christian Women's Society, which was founded at the end of September 1990 in Plovdiv, and similar societies that were subsequently founded in Sofia, Ruse, Burgas, Pernik, and Radomir.

The Christian Women's Movement is an organization of women in Bulgaria who are guided in their way of life and in raising their children by the spirit of Christian morality and universal human values, and in a spirit of national self-awareness and pride at being a member of the Bulgarian nation.

The Christian Women's Society is the nucleus of the KhZhD. Such societies are organized at the residences of the members and must consist of no fewer than five persons.

The supreme authority of the KhZhD is the general assembly, which convenes once every four years. Between sessions, the collective organ of the leadership is the National Council. The decisions of the National Council are executed by the KhZhD Executive Bureau, which also coordinates the activities of the movement on the national level.

The KhZhD is represented by its chairperson, Elisaveta Milenova, and its deputy chairperson, Nataliya Petrova.

The Christian Women's Movement unites the efforts of its members to surmount the moral crisis in society and to restore our national dignity on the basis of Christian values. The movement expresses and protects the interests of women who consider as suitably worthy their status as mothers and wives and who believe this to be the supreme implementation of their civic duty. The KhZhD struggles to guarantee to every woman the right to a free choice between being the mother of children and having a professional career, and the restoration of family traditions and the traditional nature of the Bulgarian family as the safest moral support and the fortress of the young generation. The movement opposes the turning of moral decline and economic dislocation into a threat to civil peace and peace in general.

To implement its tasks, the KhZhD tries to participate in the drafting of laws concerning the problems of women, the family, and children, and public control over the state in such matters. It supports constructive ties to schools, including those run by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in matters of education, training, and philanthropy, and it promotes cooperation with Bulgarian and international organizations and movements in resolving problems affecting women, children, and families.

The silhouettes of a man, a woman, and a child are the KhZhD emblem.

We Want Proper Housing, Children, Decent Food, and Caring Husbands

—by Elisaveta Milenova, chairwoman of the Christian Women's Movement Party and a candidate for national representative for the 3d Varna Electoral District

The Christian Women's Movement is an organization of women in Bulgaria guided in their way of life and raising their children in a spirit of Christian morality, ancient Bulgarian traditions, and pride in belonging to the Bulgarian nation. The slogan of the movement is God-Fatherland-Family.

We protect the interests of women who find their status as mothers and wives sufficiently dignified, and we believe that this is the highest implementation of their civic duty. We want to secure the right of all women to choose freely between having several children or a professional career. Under the present circumstances, choice in favor of motherhood is accompanied by economic and social inequality. We are actively working to restore the family traditions that are inseparably related to Christian doctrine and morality and are the foundations of Bulgaria's thousand-year-old history.

In modern society, the problems of women stem from the lack of realization that the work of mothers is socially useful. For example, Bulgarian legislation recognizes the equal value of the work of mothers, but in words only. Judge for yourselves: Supplemental funds are supposed to be paid for children under 16, and so is a minimal wage for

raising a child to the age of three, but only if the mother had previously been employed professionally in other activities! This is like a woman being hired as a teacher but paid no salary because she had previously been a cleaning woman in the school. Is the work of mothers not acknowledged to be socially useful?

We are not against women expressing themselves professionally in various areas of social life. Naturally, a woman may have her own professional ambitions, and it would be difficult to conceive of human civilization without the participation of women. The equal rights of men and women are unquestionable, and that is precisely why specific parental work must be paid the way skilled labor is in other areas, with no preliminary conditions. Only thus will women become truly equal, and their choice in favor of motherhood will not entail economic difficulties.

The Christian Women's Movement does not have feminist objectives. We do not divide the world into "male" and "female." God made man and woman to live together in peace and harmony like the rest of nature. The family and the upbringing of the young generation are matters that affect the entire nation. We favor a united and strong Bulgarian nation that will be a worthy partner of a United Europe.

Of late, I have been frequently asked: "Why did you agree to form an electoral alliance with the former Communists?" referring to the BSP. Personally, I do not think that any "former" or "present" Communist has anything against our objectives. Our objectives are national, as confirmed by the fact that KhZhD members include women belonging to a great variety of parties as well as, naturally, many who are members of no party at all. Let us not forget that nearly 60 percent of Bulgarian voters are women who would like to have proper housing, children, decent food, and caring husbands. Our ambition is to create a women's lobby in parliament, and, in this area, I see no place for party confrontation.

[9 Oct p 4]

[Text]

Fatherland Labor Party

"We are a small country but with rich spirituality, without which the profound all-European processes cannot be achieved."

The Fatherland Labor Party (OPT) was founded on 3 April 1990.

The party consists of clubs and local, regional, and national associations. The clubs are the primary organizations and are based on the professional-territorial principle. They include party members, sympathizers, non-party people, and young men and women. A club must consist of no fewer than 10 persons, three of whom must be party members. The primary units of the Fatherland Labor Party are the regional and local organizations united on the basis of federalism.

The national conference is the supreme organ in charge of coordinating and managing OPT activities. It is held once every two years, and, between conferences, the party is administered by a general coordination council. This is a standing OPT authority that meets no less frequently than once every three months and elects a chairman, deputy chairmen, and an operative bureau. Party and appeal councils are elected to resolve arguments between organizations, between party members, and between individual members and organizations on their respective levels.

The Fatherland Labor Party is represented by its chairman, Rumen Rusev Popov.

The main objectives of the OPT are the restoration of the national virtues and ideals, the establishment of real democracy and civil freedoms, and the building of a democratic civil society in Bulgaria that would guarantee the personal freedom of labor and the defense of the national interests, and provide equal rights, equal opportunities, freedom of choice, and the free development of all. The OPT deems its prime task to be the organization of the Bulgarian people to draft a nationwide platform and program for action regarding the national problem. According to the party members, the new Bulgaria is not an alliance of ethnic groups but a democratic state, with a social contract of equal and free citizens, and a civil society, with its own language, flag, seal, and anthem.

The Fatherland Labor Party is in favor of protecting the working people from the exploitation of hired labor, equalization, and unemployment. It favors the development of free labor and an expanded social policy. It believes that the state must interfere in the economy through its taxing, credit, and price policy in order to ensure the conditions for high labor productivity, controlled international and domestic currency balances, and broad technological development.

The Fatherland Labor Party is in favor of a law-governed democratic state, with broad self-government and true popular rule.

The Fatherland Labor Party has a flag, one side of which is green and carries the inscription "Fatherland Labor Party" and the date 3 April 1990; the other side is bicolored—red and yellow—and shaped like two clover leaves. In the center, inside a wide circle of laurel, against a green background, is a lion.

In the elections for the Grand National Assembly, the Fatherland Labor Party received 36,668 votes, which was the highest number after that of the four parliamentary forces.

For a United Civil Society

—by Rumen Popov, chairman of the Fatherland Labor Party

The specific priority views held by our party are what identify it among the various political colors in our country and define its individuality.

The first priority is that of the national idea, Bulgarian statehood, Bulgarian nationality, and the prosperity and dignity of the Bulgarian people. We favor a pragmatic state program that will guarantee national priorities and be mandatory for all parties and governments. The violation of such programs could be considered a state crime, regardless of the perpetrator: the president, the government, parliament, and so forth.

The second is that civil society is an association of free citizens. This calls for eliminating the participation of the state and its structures as an intermediary among commodity producers.

The third are commodity-monetary market relations. To us, this is a prerequisite for the development of production activities, industry, and agriculture. The argument concerning the forms of ownership is formalistic. The market, rather than the Council of Ministers, the ministries, or other state institutions, will regulate and constantly change the forms of ownership. In that sense, no economic reform is taking place today. Currently, all that are being created are exceptionally favorable conditions for the accumulation of speculative capital, the impoverishment of the citizens, the freezing of economic life and production activities, the selling of our property for nothing, and the restoration of a primitive caveman's capitalism as an alternative to a caveman's communism.

The national idea, Bulgarian statehood, a civil society, and a commodity-monetary market economy are preliminary conditions for the development of the individual. Social and spiritual security is what makes the individual. Economic freedom and independence make him a citizen. Every Bulgarian is an owner, through shares or other forms of ownership we have created by our toil, the taxes we pay, and the privations we have experienced. This property does not belong to the state. It is ours, and no one has the right to give it away without our participation. Everyone must have his own home, and the individual's work and life are sacred and inviolable.

The next priority is that of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the individual and the prevention of separation among and the granting of privileges to communities and groups, regardless of whether on an ideological, social, religious, ethnic, or other basis. Bulgaria is not a sum of communities but a single civil society.

This civil society demands and defines the priority of direct and parliamentary democracy in political life as a prerequisite for the political participation of the individual in the social development of our country. We further believe that, in the case of decisions that are particularly important to the state, the system of a national referendum should be used as the prototype of rule by the people and direct democracy.

Township self-government is a prerequisite for real democracy.

The conservative approach adopted by the OPT in politics protects our historical values, the achievements of Bulgarian statehood, and the material and spiritual goods

created by Bulgarians, regardless of when and under what kind of political or social system. We must not adopt a totalitarian and nihilistic rejection of the past but engage in the constructive continuation of what we have already accomplished during our old and most recent history. There is only one Bulgaria for us all.

The supremacy of the Constitution and the law is a priority that ensures the stability and national safety of the country. It defines the role of the state in the preservation, development, and prosperity of the Bulgarian nation and material wealth and spirituality.

The Bulgarian people have their own past and present, and have the right to a future.

[10 Oct p 4]

[Text]

Stefan Stambolov National Liberal Party

The Stefan Stambolov National Liberal Party (NLP) was founded on 21 January 1990 in Veliko Turnovo. It is the direct heir of the National Liberal Party which was founded in August 1886 by Stefan Stambolov.

The supreme leading authority of the NLP is its congress, and the Coordination Committee is its all-party executive and coordinating authority.

The NLP is represented by Khristo Ivanov Atanasov, who is the spokesman for the Coordination Committee.

The main objective of the party is for Bulgaria to become a democratic country that is technologically and structurally modern, prosperous, and ecologically clean, a country that would exist within its natural national boundaries, which much be achieved through peaceful means, through participation in European affairs as a worthy and economically and politically equal member.

The NLP acknowledges private, cooperative-shareholding, and state ownership; it promotes the privatization of property through the free issuing of shares and land to the farmers. The party favors a free market economy with social guarantees, and a policy of protectionism, technical development, and state stimulation of technological development and creation of a modern infrastructure.

The NLP is in favor of a republican system in Bulgaria, which would combine the advantages of the entire republican experience of mankind.

The symbols of the Stefan Stambolov NLP are a green flag with the golden head of a lion in the center and the inscription "Stefan Stambolov National Liberal Party," and a badge showing the face of Stefan Stambolov with the inscription "National Liberal Party" and the year of its founding, 1886.

Dignity and Self-Respect as Medicine for the Crisis

—by Khristo Atanasov, spokesman for the Coordination Committee of the Stefan Stambolov NLP

One year of parliamentary democracy has proved that something remains to be desired in the implementation of democratic change in society. The Stefan Stambolov NLP has always put national interests above anything else. The freedom and independence of the Bulgarian people are guaranteed by their dignity and self-respect.

Let us not forget that, in the past, the Stambolov NLP was the strongest political force in the defense of Bulgarian national sovereignty and freedom. That was a time when Bulgaria rejected the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty and took the European path of development. The tempestuous building of the transportation grid and increased farming output enhanced the international authority of the state. The policy of protectionism of the Bulgarian economy restricted and controlled foreign economic intervention in the economy. The creation of a modern infrastructure enhanced the prestige of the Bulgarians in the eyes of Europe as a people who were the masters of their means of production.

Today the main objectives of the NLP, which are part of its electoral program, share some features with the BSP. Democratic and universal features are the binding link between the two parties. The four power branches in our country set the tone for change.

In entering into a coalition with the BSP, the Stefan Stambolov NLP will struggle to shape the new features of the parliament, which must be ethical and professional so that hatred and immorality yield to the ideals of the Stambolov movement: Bulgaria above all. To ensure the implementation of the objectives in the political process and the peaceful transition to democratization, we must strictly observe the constitutional principles and take into consideration the basic interests of the people. We do not promise miracles either before or after the elections. Our aspiration is to attain, through sensible means, a revival in production, the observance of strict legality and order, the elimination of unemployment, and the providing of real social protection to the population.

* * *

Bulgarian Socialist Youth Federation

The Bulgarian Socialist Youth Federation (FBSM) was founded on 7 July 1990 in Sofia. The congress of Socialist Associations for Youth was attended by 97 representatives of 48 youth clubs, councils, and organizations. The constituent protocol of the FBSM was signed by 79 delegates from 41 organizations.

The FBSM unites, on a voluntary basis, independent youth groups set up on the basis of democratic socialism and working for a radical renovation of society. The main organizational principle of the FBSM is that of federal unity. In this case, all groups retain their independence and freedom of action. It is only the resolutions adopted by the national organs on matters stipulated in the structural rules that are mandatory.

The Federal Congress is the supreme standing authority of the FBSM. It has a two-year term and must meet no less

frequently than twice annually. It chooses the operative bureau of the federation, which has limited executive powers, and a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and a control commission.

The FBSM is represented by its chairman, Fidel Nikolov Kosev, and operative bureau members Spilyan Nikolov Ivanov, Svetlana Ivanova Lalova, and Tsvetan Stefanov Bankov.

* * *

We Do Not Classify Young People by Color

—by Fidel Kosev, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Youth Federation

Socialist values are our political foundation. Our objective is to meet the needs of the young people in Bulgaria.

The young generation with socialist convictions is not one to launder foreign money or to receive gifts from on high. We have organized in order to influence those who can solve youth problems. This cannot be done by holding positions, chairs, or desks. The social position toward which we aspire will make it possible to openly face the difficulties confronting young people in Bulgaria. That is our reason for participating in the elections.

The FBSM has its electoral platform, in which it seeks its own way of solving the vital problems of the young. However, as part of the coalition, we can see these problems within the context of national problems: in the reforms of the economy and of educational and state institutions. We do not wish for the economic transition to become a machine for the manufacturing of young unemployed. Our economic prosperity must not lead to our spiritual impoverishment.

Last year, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] platform had one entire page—page 45—dedicated to the young. It bore the thunderous heading "Youth is ours and so is the future." Now, after the active participation of the SDS in the administration of the country, youth problems are once again shunted to the side. In the current campaign, the opposite is happening. No one besides the BSP is addressing itself to the young in platforms and programs. Instead, most guarantee us economic rights based on the criteria of labor seniority and age. Thanks a lot! We seek precisely the opposite: the elimination of the degrading "young specialist" category. A specialist is a specialist, regardless of whether he is young or old.

To us, young people are not classified by color, although we are being described as "red garbage." We share common problems. The pragmatic and least painful ways of solving them are those that would unite the will of the young to prove themselves. We work and shall continue to work for them, for Bulgaria!

[11 Oct p 4]

[Text]

Bulgarian Liberal Party

The Bulgarian Liberal Party (BLP) was founded on 1 September 1990 in Sofia. It is the party of business circles, specialists, and businessmen from all areas of society and does not lay claim to being a nationwide party.

The supreme authority of the party is the congress, which convenes once every four years. The National Conference meets at least once every year. The Republican Executive Council is the functional authority of the BLP. It consists of a chairman, a general secretary, deputy chairmen for political problems and economic activities, a cashier, and secretaries for the various areas. The BLP congress also chooses a Control Council.

The BLP is represented by its chairman, Vulkan Ivanov Vergiev, and General Secretary Ekaterina Ivanova Zakharieva.

A dolphin is the symbol of the BLP.

A Policy of Opposing Politics Treated as Deals

—by *Vulkan Vergiev, chairman of the BLP*

Political life became divided into two opposing poles. The symptoms of party bias and division became clearly apparent in the SDS. Mutual abuse gradually replaced cultural dialogue. The behavior of many parties within that alliance consisted of nothing but fierce criticism of not only the past but also of all efforts made in the present. An essential part of the statements of the leaders of these parties was mudslinging. Totally in the throes of passions, not one of them suggested how to resolve the crisis and undertake the transition.

Such was the political situation at the time the BLP was founded. The party took the path of surviving and strengthening.

In our electoral alliance with the BSP, we found strength and, above all, reason, and we united for the sake of Bulgaria's interests—and not only for the sake of our parties, however different the political ideas separating us may have been. We did what was more difficult in politics because we clearly understand that Bulgaria needs tranquillity and reason in political life. That is the link that binds the BSP to the BLP.

The quality of the future parliament will depend on the state of Bulgarian politics at that time. I mention the parliament because the legislation and the government as well as the future of the country will be the products of its activities.

At this point, we touch upon the question of who is interested in a weak parliament. Who liked it, and why was it comfortable for such a person to live in a state of uncertainty in his old age?

We have witnessed in the course of an entire year the amount of damage caused by individual incompetence and personal greed. These were major errors in our foreign

policy, our economy, and our national security. I will not mention the erroneous strategy in making the reform. I do not agree with having the most important ministries become targets of political deals. They must be instruments for proving the qualities of candidate ministers.

Socialist Youth Union

The Socialist Youth Union (SMS) was founded on 17 March 1990 in Sofia. Its constituent meeting was attended by 56 delegates from 28 Bulgarian settlements.

This is an independent sociopolitical organization that unites young people on a common ideological base for the sake of expressing and defending youth interests, rights, and freedoms. This union is an extension of the democratic principle of the Bulgarian Youth Movement: anti-fascism and socialism.

The basic organizational principles of the SMS are democratic unity and individual and collective responsibility and equality.

The National Conference, which has a two-year term, is the supreme standing authority of the SMS self-government. The permanent executive authority of the union is the National Council, which may consist of from nine to 19 members. The control activities in the SMS are provided by the National Control Commission.

The SMS is represented by its chairman, Yuriy Borisov.

The symbol of the SMS is a dark red flag. On one side it bears, in white letters, the inscription "Socialist Youth Union"; on the other, in blue letters, are "Free, Thinking, Strong." Its emblem is a blue torch with a red flame tracing the letters SMS.

We Want To Live in a Normal Country

—by *Yuriy Borisov, chairman of the Socialist Youth Union*

The SDS Coordination Council in Stara Zagora is in the process of choosing a candidate mayor. A test is administered. One of the applicants, after having answered all questions, is asked the following: "If your best candidate for managing a given area is a member of the BSP, would you appoint him?" "Naturally." The candidate fails utterly.

This was an actual recent occurrence. Pictures we are used to. A model class-party approach. If this is what is called "communism," it is indeed taking a long time to disappear. It is even making itself prettier as it looks at itself in the mirror, before a new marriage. "Let us destroy the party enemy, and then the rivers of paradise will flow...." Nothing old has been forgotten. This is an impeccable 9 September approach, but this time it is performed as a comedy.

I warmly recommend to the members of the Socialist Youth Union the slogan "We want a normal state!" It does

not matter that it was raised by the SDS. For everything that is good, everything born in Bulgaria, is it not our common national value?

We want a country in which there is more building than destruction. We want a country in which the Constitution and the laws are respected. We want a parliament that would not be confused with Battenberg Square, and whose seats will not be confused with the street pavement. We want production and not endless tricks with money. We want trade unions and not parties dressed in worker clothing. We want local professionals and not blue, red, or striped "street sweepers." We want national dignity and not bowing to distant rich uncles. We want less hatred expressed in highfalutin meaningless cliches. We want those who are incompetent and lazy to no longer justify their actions by referring to the notorious system. We want a state that would prove to them that this trick cannot be applied an entire lifetime.

If the question of our normalcy is not a youth problem, whose problem is it? Who will be living tomorrow in this country? Who is today creating the mental layers that will last a lifetime? In my view, those who speak simply and exclusively about youth problems, without linking them to the common problems, with all our weakened roots and our general present lightweight attitude, are either ignorant or hypocritical.

Leaders, Members of Legislative Commission *92P20067A*

[Editorial Report] Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK No. 94 in Bulgarian on 15 November on pages 3-4 publishes the names of the leaders and the members of the Legislative Commission, elected by the National Assembly on 6 November 1991. The party affiliation of the leaders and the members was included in the lists of national representatives published in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK Nos. 88, 91, and 94 on 25 October, 5 November, and 15 November, respectively. The Legislative Commission will consist of 28 national representatives. The staff members of the commission are: Chairman Aleksandur Asenov Dzherov, of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]; Deputy Chairman Emil Georgiev Buchkov, of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]; and Deputy Chairman Yordan Kirilov Shkolagerski, of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. The members of the commission are:

- Ana Georgieva Milenkova, BSP
- Ana Ivanova Karaivanova-Davidova, BSP
- Vasil Stoyanov Gotsev, SDS
- Velislava Milkova Gyurova, SDS
- Verzhiniya Kirilova Velcheva, SDS
- Veselina Khristova Rasheeva, SDS
- Vladislav Zhelyazkov Daskalov, SDS
- Georgi Evdokiev Markov, SDS
- Georgi Kostov Kostov, SDS
- Gospodin Atanasov Atanasov, SDS
- Dimitur Velev Dimitrov, BSP
- Dimitur Georgiev Dimitrov, BSP
- Dimitur Nikolov Mikhaylov, BSP
- Dragiya Zhelyazkov Dragiev, SDS

- Ekaterina Ivanova Mikhaylova, SDS
- Zlatka Ruseva Ruseva, SDS
- Ibrahim Tosun Tatarli, DPS
- Ilko Mois Eskenazi, SDS
- Ismail Mehmed Ismail, DPS
- Mariana Simeonova Khristova, BSP
- Mariela Nikolaeva Miteva, BSP
- Plamen Vulkanov Vulkanov, BSP
- Rosen Andreev Karadimov, BSP
- Rosen Khubenov Stoilov, BSP
- Yanaki Boyanov Stoilov, BSP

More Replacements for National Representatives *92P20065A*

[Editorial Report] Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK No. 94 in Bulgarian on 15 November on pages 9-10 publishes a decision of the Central Electoral Commission giving the names of replacements for persons elected to the National Assembly on 13 October who have been elected government ministers. The individuals who will replace them are all representatives from the Union of Democratic Forces. The new national representatives are:

- Manol Petrov Todorov, of the 23d Electoral District of Sofia (first Sofia City district), replacing Filip Dimitrov Dimitrov.
- Rumen Georgiev Urumov, of the 23d Electoral District of Sofia (first Sofia City district), replacing Valentin Iliev Vasilev.
- Doncho Botev Papazov, of the 25th Electoral District of Sofia (third Sofia City district), replacing Stoyan Dimitrov Ganey.
- Rumen Zdravkov Bikov, of the 25th Electoral District of Sofia (third Sofia City district), replacing Vekil Vasilev Vanov.
- Krasimir Shtilyanov Stefanov, of the 22d Electoral District of Smolyan, replacing Nikolay Kirilov Vasilev.
- Nencho Petkov Nenchev, of the 16th Electoral District of Plovdiv, replacing Ivan Yordanov Kostov.
- Ivan Iliev Floreskov, of the 12th Electoral District of Mikhaylovgrad, replacing Ivan Nikolov Pushkarov.
- Slav Vasilev Danev, of the 31st Electoral District of Yambol, replacing Dimitur Petrov Ludzhev.
- Tsvetan Ivanov Dimitrov, of the 4th Electoral District of Veliko Turnovo, replacing Elka Georgieva Konstantinova.

New Taxation Administration Described

92BA0106A Sofia IKONOMICESKI ZHIVOT in Bulgarian 2 Oct 91 p 5

[Article by finance expert Yordan Milkanov: "In the Face of Taxes, All Are Equal! The New Tax Administration, a Financial Police Force"—first paragraph is IKONOMICESKI ZHIVOT introduction]

[Text] A small portion of the citizens in charge of a private business or additional work declare their earnings for the levying of income tax. There are shocking cases of earnings over the annual income of 1,680 leva being intentionally concealed, which are taxable.

In accordance with Council of Ministers' Decree No. 29 from 1991, Bulgaria is in the process of forming a new tax police-administration. The territorial tax offices (inspectorates) are being set up on the territory of the former regional cities and in the townships. The structure of the tax inspectorate includes territorial offices, with chief tax experts, tax experts, and tax specialists. Besides the tax services in the cities, tax bureaus are being formed in the smaller towns. And the territorial inspectorates are managed by a chief of the territorial tax administration, who is appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Finance. The chiefs of administrations have already been named for most positions in the country, but competitions for specialists are slow, and, consequently, as of 1 September 1991, the staffs of most tax administrations and bureaus in the country had not been filled.

And, while the cat's away, the mice will play. For example, of the 2,560 firms registered by the Veliko Turnovo regional court in the territory of the Veliko Turnovo township, only 1,082 pay taxes. From the submitted declarations, it is clear that a considerable portion of citizens in charge of a private business or additional work have declared incomes under the taxable minimum—1,680 leva (the nontaxable annual income). These instances include shocking cases of intent to conceal income. To conceal their incomes, some firms, for example, buy and sell goods without invoices, grossly violating the Accounting Law. According to Article 56 of this law, they are subject to a fine of up to 500 leva, and, with a second violation, to a fine of up to 2,000 leva. Statements of established violations are drawn up by the organs of financial control, and punitive decrees are issued by the Minister of Finance or by officials authorized by him—the chiefs of the territorial tax administrations. And appeals take place through the channels of the law for administrative violations and penalties.

The newly established tax administration in Bulgaria does not seek to liquidate private business, but, with taxes, everyone is equal—private, cooperative and state firms, and organizations. The tax legislation must be strictly obeyed by these organizations, as happens in the United States and all European countries.

Tax violations (delicts) in the West are characterized as crimes—in the United States, Germany, Italy, and the other countries.

For example, in the United States, within the structure of the Internal Revenue Service, under the Treasury Department, sections are established for criminal tax investigations. Special criminal investigative agents direct their efforts toward a number of programs against criminal activities: the laundering of "dirty money," questionable schemes for the deposit and refund of taxes, and other tax concealments—federal and international violations of the tax laws.

In Germany, for instance, concealing income and property from taxation is considered a crime under the Criminal Code. In the tax administration, special sections of tax inspectors are set up, whose chief goal is to find delicts in that region and initiate sanctions against the violators.

Developed to perfection are the tax police in Italy. In essence, they are a militarized organization in the system of the Ministry of Finance—uniformed; armed with the equipment necessary for their activities, military and other; and with great legal authority to control and ensure adherence to the tax and customs laws of the country. This group, already called the Financial Guards, leads a war against organized crime with narcotics, currency violations, and crimes, and ensures customs control and the security of the Ministry of Finance and its sections.

Like the financial police in the West, the tax administration was created in Bulgaria. It will exercise current and subsequent financial control over enforcing the tax-financial legislation in the country. It will have control over the entire sphere of payments of taxes, charges, and other state claims. It will see to the accurate, timely, and reliable reflection of the firms' operations in their accounts, as provided in the normative deeds, with a goal toward correct assessments for the objects of taxation—sales, profit, incomes, properties and possessions, proceeds from firms and individuals, alcoholic beverages, and so forth.

Clearly, the interests of the state and the budget objectively required the creation of the new tax organs to exercise effective taxation control in the future. Thus, businessmen in Bulgaria focusing on profit must consider whether to increase profit by deferring taxes and late fees or by hampering the operations and sales of the firms. At present in Bulgaria, there is unified taxation, which, since 1 January 1991, has been decreased by half—according to the Law on Gross Income Tax, with its new progressive table. Every income level, regardless of the amount or its source, is placed on an equal basis in the market economy and in terms of conditions for taxation. With this unified taxation, high incomes have a slight increase, which is half of that up to 31 December 1990. Thus, dear businessmen, there is no sense in risking concealment of taxes through concealment of income. Let everyone be equal before the law and taxes, and your profit come not through concealment of taxes but from your activities and your increased daily turnover of capital.

Hexagonal Association in Nutshell

92CH0114B Prague DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED
in Czech No 42, 1991 p H1

[Text]

Establishment

On 11-12 November 1989, at a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs and deputy prime ministers of Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria in Budapest, convened on Hungary's initiative; on 20 May 1990 Czechoslovakia was admitted to membership, and the name was changed to Pentagonal; on 27 July 1991, at the meeting in Dubrovnik, Poland was admitted and the group adopted the name Hexagonal.

Characteristics

A regional integrating association without fixed institutions or structures, which wants to contribute, in accord with the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to the development of mutually beneficial partnership relations, as well as to Europe-wide economic, political, ecological, and cultural cooperation. Political consultations are limited to meetings of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs; about 80 joint projects, coordinated by 12 work groups, are financed from the budgets of member states and credits from international financial institutions, for example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank; among the first joint projects is the transportation linkup Bratislava-Vienna-Budapest and modernization of the railway line from Verona through Munich to Prague, oil pipelines, a computerized telephone network, and others; CSFR is the guarantor of the group for energy production, and the group for culture, education, and youth exchange, Italy guarantees the activities of the transportation group, Hungary the group for cooperation among small and medium enterprises, Austria the environmental group, etc. For the development of nonpolitical club activities within the framework of the Hexagonal, the association Amicus was founded in Kosice on 20 April 1991, whose sponsors are Charter 77 and the East Slovakian Iron Works. The first cultural event of the Hexagonal was the festival of theatre, music, ballet, and puppeteering on 19-29 July 1991 in Cividale del Friuli—Mittlefest.

Headquarters

Hexagonal does not have permanent headquarters, meetings and discussions take place in the country which presides over the organization according to the rotation system.

Membership

CSFR, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Austria.

Political Impact of Danube Dam Controversy Weighed

92CH0141A Paris LE MONDE in French
8 Nov 91 p 11

[Article by special correspondent Yves-Michel Riols: "Gabcikovo, a Hungarian-Slovak Bone of Contention"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] The Danube dam, which was begun under socialist rule, is now poisoning the relations between Budapest, Prague, and Bratislava.

"It's like the Berlin Wall." Andras Sarkany, one of the leaders of the Slovakian presidency of the ecologist movement Eurochaine, points to an outsized picture drawn on one of the enormous concrete walls of the Gabcikovo hydroelectric-station reservoir. It depicts a horse painfully struggling out of the water and crying for help. It is a deliberately lyrical image, one that symbolizes the unequal fight to keep the site from being built.

Like the Berlin Wall, the dam is a relic of the Stalinist era. After more than 25 years of preparation, the communist governments of Prague and Budapest ratified a treaty in 1977 to construct a double dam—one at Gabcikovo and the other at Nagymaros, 170 km [kilometers] downstream in Hungary—on the Danube. Fourteen years later the work is still unfinished. Today the pharaonic structure from another era is poisoning relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and fueling the ethnic tensions between the two countries. With central Europe now striving to contain nationalist movements and build the bridges for a new post-socialist cooperation, the dam conflict serves as a test.

Work on the Gabcikovo site was suspended after the "velvet revolution." But the government of Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, got the project moving again in July. The step reflected the Slovakian authorities' exasperation after a year of fruitless negotiations with the Hungarians. Budapest will no longer hear of starting up the dam in any form whatsoever. Moreover, it was the last socialist government that interrupted work in Nagymaros in the spring of 1989, under unprecedented public pressure. Last April the Magyar Parliament clearly delimited the Hungarian emissaries's mandate: to negotiate the annulment of the 1977 agreement and nothing more.

That leaves matters at a total stalemate. The Gabcikovo station cannot operate without Budapest's cooperation, for the holding lake that is needed to supply the dam with water is in Dunakiliti, in Hungarian territory. The only solution is to divert the course of the Danube—which would amount to changing the shape of the borders between the two countries. Unless there is a compromise, the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian dam problem could turn into a genuine nationalist time bomb.

Gabcikovo is located in a region inhabited primarily by Slovakia's Hungarian minority, who make up 10 percent of the population (about 600,000 people). The essentially rural minority group is fiercely opposed to the dam and believes (as does the Budapest government) that its operation would cause massive contamination of the underground water tables, which in turn would deal a fatal blow to local agriculture. Other risks include pollution of the Danube, which supplies thousands of households with drinking water, and the threat of floods caused by raising the river's level.

But ecological arguments have already taken a back seat. "We have no guarantees for our future," worries Ivan

Gyurcsik, one of the leaders of the Coexistence movement, the principal political party of the Slovakian Hungarians. "The Bratislava government is seeking to destroy the last Hungarian fortress in the country." And he raises a catastrophic scenario: "The dam will trigger a massive rural exodus which, ultimately, will condemn us to assimilation."

It was to try to defuse this climate of widespread distrust that the Czechoslovakian environmental minister Josef Vavrousek traveled to Budapest last 10 September. "We must dissipate the myths and prejudices," he stressed before the three parliamentary committees that received him. "We must manage this common inheritance of the totalitarian era." Despite the prevailing tone of courtesy, that meeting too ended in failure. The Czechoslovakians denounce the unilateral work stoppage and want to get negotiations started again to work out another agreement. But the Hungarians are firm: Only the annulment of the 1977 treaty is open to discussion.

The mobilization against the double Danube dam has worked to catalyze Hungary's anticommunist opposition movements. Today no party dares reverse its position on halting work at Nagymaros, or it risks losing all credibility with the public. But Gabčíkovo is far from having the same symbolic meaning for the Slovaks. The region has been hard hit by unemployment, and the dam is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as an important creator of jobs. Another reason is that Slovakia suffers from a real energy deficit that has recently been aggravated by the end of the cheap gas and oil shipments from the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, there is a powerful pro-dam lobby inside the Bratislava government; one of the main construction companies working on the Gabčíkovo site is run by Ivan Carnogusky, the brother of the Slovakian prime minister. The principal political organizations also support the dam project. The Slovakian counterpart to Civic Forum, Public Against Violence (VPN), did voice a few doubts during last year's elections, but since joining the government coalition the VPN has rallied to the majority position. Even Slovakia's Green Party is not opposed to Gabčíkovo. "We have to be realistic," says its president Peter Sabo. "The dam is nearly completed, it can't be destroyed; it must be finished, subject to ecological guarantees."

As a consequence, only the Hungarian organizations and a tiny ecologist movement that aims to be "pluri-ethnic" continue to fight. "As soon as we protest," exclaims Andras Sarkany indignantly, "the Bratislava government accuses us of being agents of Budapest." And with the June 1992 legislative elections coming up, the Magyar community fears escalating nationalism, now that the Slovakian separatists are gaining ground. "The future of Gabčíkovo," worries Ivan Gyurcsik, "is now closely tied to the question of independence. If Bratislava breaks with Prague, it will be disastrous: The dam will immediately be put into operation and we will be isolated in a new Serbia!"

OH Submits Specific Language for Referendum

92CH0122B Prague INFORUM in Czech 26 Sep 91 p 1

"Text" of an appeal by unidentified Civic Movement Federal Assembly deputies: "An Appeal by the Citizens"—first paragraph is INFORUM introduction]

[Text] Text of a supplement to the resolution of the OH [Civic Movement] Republican Council, containing the proposal for the question to be posed in the referendum, as it has been put forward in the FS [Federal Assembly] by the Civic Movement [OH] representatives:

The Federal Assembly of the CSFR is submitting a proposal to the president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic that he should call for a referendum simultaneously in the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Republic, in which the following question will be posed to the citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic:

"Do you agree that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic should continue to remain in a joint federal state, which will be granted authority over the following issues, in particular, to ensure their uniform resolution?

"Foreign affairs; defense and its economic assurance; protection of the constitutional organization and security of the CSFR; protection of the state borders, travel documents, granting of permissions for foreigners to enter and reside in the country; regulation of the possession and use of weapons and explosives.

"Currency and a single bank of issue; regulation of the system, administration, and control of taxes and duties, as well as guidelines for policies on grants, write-offs, and foreign currency; federal material resources and foreign currency reserves.

"Metrology, standardization, state testing; state statistical information.

"The energy network; nuclear safety; the communications, mail, and telecommunications network; regulation of transportation, transportation routes and facilities, and overland, railroad and air traffic, and maritime navigation.

"Regulation of basic issues concerning the rights of citizens so as to ensure the equality of citizens throughout the territory of the federation, and regulation of conditions for a uniform labor and product market; basic environmental issues.

"The direct binding nature of federal legal standards in both republics; protection of the federal constitutionality, supervision over the implementation of federal assembly laws, control in the area of the federation's jurisdiction, ensurance of the uniformity of court decisions when using federal legal standards; fulfillment of duties issuing for the CSFR from international obligations."

Slovak Columnist Ponicka on Common State

92CH0124A Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech
29 Oct 91 p 7

[Interview with Hana Ponicka by Karel Hvizdala; place and date not given: "I Cannot Think Differently Than My Nation: Interview With Slovak Author Hana Ponicka"]

[Text] [Hvzdala] You started writing the "Slovak Column" for our newspaper almost a year ago but you persevered only till last summer. Why did you drop it? Or did you totally withdraw from public political life at that time?

[Ponicka] I have to admit that I found it exhausting, mainly because I discovered that I could not make sense of anything any more. Because, suddenly, not only uncivilized behavior but also lack of fortitude crept into our politics in Slovakia. For example, a politician would state one thing about an issue in the morning and something totally different that same afternoon. Or he would talk quite differently within his club or movement than in public. As a result, I not only lost track of politics, I also lost my respect for it and so I stopped.

[Hvzdala] These are also the reasons why, in Bohemia-Moravia, one sometimes hears that what is happening in Slovakia is no longer an emancipation process but an attempt to found a new state that will no longer be democratic.... Don't you sometimes have the same misgivings?

[Ponicka] I understand your misgivings, and now I even understand why I did not understand them in the past. I was afraid—at least at one point—that even in Bohemia-Moravia attitudes were heading toward separation.

[Hvzdala] What made you think that the Czechs want to break away from the Slovaks?

[Ponicka] I would not say that the Czechs are trying to break away but that you no longer care as much about a common state and that economic problems are mainly to blame. I have the suspicion that whenever we want a specific area of jurisdiction, you make this into a very complicated issue and would prefer to consent to the Slovaks separating. I did not see the same desire in you to preserve a common state as I have.

[Hvzdala] What about now?

[Ponicka] Now I am pleasantly surprised that this is not so; but at that time I was angry even at the president because he stated in some foreign country that a referendum would be held and that the Slovaks would decide what they want. After all, the Czechs, too, would decide what they want, but he did not mention that.... However, the situation really is different now and I can clearly feel a prevalent attempt to preserve the state among the most important political powers. I even see a feeling of responsibility for the fate of the Slovaks in it. The president is truly also our president.

[Hvzdala] I would like our discussion to return to the Czech fears: There is an ever stronger belief that an

independent Slovakia could have an undemocratic government and that this government—even if indirectly—would begin to support the undemocratic forces in Bohemia-Moravia. What is your opinion on this?

[Ponicka] I am apprehensive about some movements whose programs advocate the *Slovensky stat* [Slovak State] and this gives the impression that they wish to renew that state. My impression is confirmed by the fact that these people, even during a time of dissent, were opposed to a Slovak national uprising that wanted to be connected with the First Republic and included the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia in its program. That is why exile writings stated that the Slovak national uprising was aimed against its own state. In addition, proracist trends frequently appeared in the emigre press, and I took a strong stand against them. I am also afraid that if a new Slovak state were created with the political forces that are present now, it could be a state with a one-party government and it would not be a democracy.

[Hvzdala] According to statistics, about 38 percent of Slovaks support the federation, one-third supports an independent state, and one-third is undecided. In other words, if a referendum were held, the outcome would depend on which side the undecided group chooses. What do you believe that we Czechs should do to make this third choose the federation?

[Ponicka] I go a lot by feelings and impressions and, personally, I believe that the Slovaks perceived the president's increased interest in Slovakia very favorably. The fact that he visited Slovakia several times recently had a very positive effect. We need to feel that the president is also our president. I cannot express it properly, but I am sure about one thing: if the leading politicians show a genuine interest in Slovakia, it gives a good impression. Perhaps I should make one more comment about the separatist trends: it is surely indicative that the most vociferous Slovak authors are those who used to be members of the central committee of the KSS [Communist Party of Slovakia]. I call them the heavy cavalry of the communists. They are the ones who join up with the militant Slovaks in exile, the ones who insult Masaryk and want an independent Slovakia. Therefore I see the greatest danger in a union of communist totalitarianism with a new ideological totalitarianism. If the new state were to be established, for instance, on economic principles, I would not have the same apprehensions as if it were to be founded on some ideology again. In my opinion, the Christian-Catholic ideology of the "Slovensky stat" is showing its teeth in all of this.

[Hvzdala] This model—as history has shown—is very dangerous. All modern states are based on a civil rights society. Why doesn't Slovakia reflect this experience?

[Ponicka] I am a little skeptical about people who say that only the civil rights perspective should predominate in our country because there are nations that have not yet become sufficiently emancipated and that do not have the feeling that their rights have been asserted. From the human aspect, their frame of mind is understandable, and it would

be desirable for one to go to meet them partway since they are independent national units.

[Hvizdala] Don't you think that these problems could be divided into cultural problems and political ones? They should become emancipated culturally, but politically they should feel responsible for the fate of the state, just like the Germans, Italians, and Frenchmen living in Switzerland proudly state that they are Swiss.

[Ponicka] It would be desirable, but, unfortunately, it is not always possible because some nations develop differently. You see, our state is very young.... I believe that the problem is much more complex than the way it is usually presented. If we adhered only to the civil rights principle, we would limit Slovakia's independence in the federation. I do not advocate a unitarian state, what I do advocate is that Slovakia should have specific areas of jurisdiction, including, in part, the economy and foreign policy. I am convinced that the time has come when this can be done.

[Hvizdala] But that is the core of the problem: even you, though you say that you totally support the federation, demand a slightly different economy and an independent foreign policy. That is not possible. Apart from other things, one mark of a federation is a single economy and a single foreign policy.... Aren't you really saying the same as the people whom you oppose?

[Ponicka] No, I do not want a different economy and a different foreign policy. I only want some degree of difference in the economy and some degree of difference in the foreign policy.

[Hvizdala] But that is not possible. A federation has to have one economy and one foreign policy....

[Ponicka] I admit that I do not totally understand it, but as a sensitive person, I receive impulses from my friends, from politicians, and they believe that it is possible. I cannot be insensible to the opinions of these people, my people. I cannot think differently than my nation. But, on the other hand, I know that the average people in the countryside do not wish to have an independent Slovakia, not because they are bad Slovaks but simply because they feel that we would be worse off.

Affirmation of Democracy Seen as Rationale

92CH0140A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
1 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Jan Urban: "The Justification of the State"]

[Text] At first glance, it would seem that this is the end of the heretical idea of supranational coexistence between citizens in a country which was, at one time, referred to as the Czechoslovak Republic. That which is most essential; that the nondemocratic monarchy was followed by an attempt at a democratic republic, soon ceased to be important to many politicians. In those days, just as is the case today. However, linguistic nationalism is audible today mainly as a result of the inaudibility of other, civic and democratic voices.

Neither the president of the republic nor the federal government and parliament have, to this day, clearly and intelligibly stated why it is important for Czechs and Slovaks (but also for Moravians, Hungarians, Silesians, Poles, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Romanies, Germans, Jews, and Czechoslovaks) to remain together in this state. It is no longer sufficient to explain that it would not be good to effect a partition. Someone has to define why Czechoslovakia has any meaning. Why does a common supranational state have any meaning in Central Europe. The struggle for this state is far from completed. Or, more accurately, it would not need to be finished, to the extent to which politicians, who are interested in preserving it, would enter this struggle openly and energetically. Without resorting to evasion, without being taciturn, and without making excuses with regard to budgets. After Marcel Stryka, the first member of the government to state so clearly was Jozef Baksay—this is a matter of a conflict between democracy and fascism.

He is correct. The nationalism of egg-throwing storm troopers, of an unseeing police, of evasive politicians, and of prohibited articles—these are not the language of the right to self-determination. This is a totalitarian ideology. It is the vestibule of fascism. It is necessary to admit that a large part of the blame for the current status of things is also due to the silence and evasiveness of the federal authorities, as well as of the Czech representation. Shortly after the elections, a federal government came into being which failed to acquire an adequate amount of moral authority in the republics. It was also characterized by the effort of the president to assist in a more rapid pace of change through personal informal negotiations, something which further weakened the position of the federal government. Neither unity nor an expressly profederal strategy came into being and, instead of a parliamentary policy of gradual constitutional reforms, the politicking of behind-the-scenes negotiations by representatives of the national governments, which were uncontrolled by anyone, prevailed. As Jozef Baksay said, we stand today "probably at the most important crossroads of our total history up to this time." However, at the same time, this is a challenge. It is a stellar hour for some politicians of this still united land in which their decisions will influence the lives of future generations.

The moral dimension of the nonviolent opposition to a totalitarian "ism" has been replaced by us with an immature notion regarding the omnipotence and durability of political maneuvering. All actions have become party "policy."

Even President Havel has lost much of his moral authority as a determined promoter of human rights from the past period, but has not been able to acquire an equally important amount of authority as a politician among the remaining entities on the domestic scene. A politician who is perceived abroad as a great moral authority in posttotalitarian Europe is perceived at home only as the first among equals and arrangements with him are violated with the same ease as all others. Face to face with arrogant political

parties, with an unfocused parliament, and with self-conscious national councils, our domestic politicians, in their present image, give the impression of being passive and tired.

The fate of the state, which was the oldest and most successful endeavor to establish parliamentary democracy in this part of the continent, will be decided under undemocratic and unconstitutional conditions. Without the controls exercised by a constitutional court and in an unbalanced encounter between three legislative bodies with three different governments. In a conflict without rules, which change in every round of haggling over spheres of influence. This suits the ambitious politicians, but is detrimental to the state. The state requires rules and a positive vision of its purpose.

Czech Daily's Commentary on Bratislava Incident

92CH0122A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Czech
29 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Jiri Hanak and Jaroslav Veis: "Two Minutes"]

[Text] Whoever wished to see, saw, whoever wished to hear, heard, and whoever wishes to believe, must hope for a miracle. Because the demonstration for the 73d anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia was turned into a nationalist frenzy by many of the 15,000 participants.

Following the Slovak representatives, and following private citizen Kocab, even the federation got its share of rotten eggs. Under these conditions, the president may well have found himself in the most difficult and most insulting situation he has been in during the entire time he has held office. All he did was to ask the crowd to do something as simple as keeping two minutes of silence for all those who laid down their lives for freedom in both nations. All he got was two minutes of crude yelling and catcalls.

Those two minutes of boorishness and yelling not only insulted the president and the people who were on the platform with him. They insulted everyone who, up to that point, was still considering how to preserve a joint state. Everyone who saw and heard must have had but one question in his mind: Is there any sense to this any more?

Yes, there is—on one condition: That a miracle happens.

This miracle would have to take place above the Danube. Several hundred, if not merely several dozen, Slovak politicians—creators of nations—would not only have to apologize. They would have to start playing a clean game; they would have to do so right away by striving to hold a referendum as quickly as possible. They would have to allow not only the organized political underground to speak, but also all—at this point probably frightened—Slovak citizens. Not only 17 percent of those who support them, but all the citizens must be allowed to express their yes or their no.

If the separatists get their way, let them celebrate the first anniversary of an independent Slovak state next year. However, if the citizens reject them, the Czechoslovak state will have to be strong enough to ensure that during

the celebrations of the 74th anniversary of its founding, wherever they may be, its president will be able to say whatever he wants without being insulted. Even if he merely requests two minutes of silence for those who gave their lives for the state.

Indigenous Gypsies in Statistics

92CH0114A Prague *DOKUMENTACNI PREHLED*
in Czech No 41, 1991 pp H1-4

[Unattributed article: "Gypsies in Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Gypsies originated in central and northwest India. They left there toward the end of the first century A.D. and traveled through the Middle East in the 12th to 15th centuries along the Danube basin to Central Europe, and through Egypt to North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, dispersing practically throughout the entire world. From their country of origin they brought typical anthropological features and language, to this day very similar to Hindi, which has been preserved over centuries and which is spoken by Gypsies around the world. Gypsies first appeared on the territory of Czechoslovakia in the 13th century. Of the 14 Gypsy ethnic groups, four are found on the territory of Czechoslovakia—Slavic, Hungarian, Ollah, and German.

Gypsies' Status in Society

Until the 19th century, Gypsies lived a seminomadic existence in family groups and refused to adopt a settled way of life. As a result, however, they were harshly persecuted, and even paid for it by the loss of their traditional means of livelihood as well as by disintegration of their family bands.

Czechoslovak law No. 117/1927, which was still valid as a legal norm even after the year 1945, used exclusively the term "roving Gypsies." It set down formal rules for leading a nomadic life, camping, and keeping track of the migrating bands, and introduced the registration of Gypsies by means of special identification cards.

In 1939 a decree was issued even in this country declaring Gypsies to be an inferior race, and in 1943 the so-called final solution of the Gypsy question began—physical liquidation in concentration camps (of the original 10,000 or so Gypsies who lived in the Czech lands at the beginning of the occupation, only several hundred survived).

After 1945, the issue of the nomadic way of life was resolved by law No. 74/1958 on the permanent settlement of nomadic peoples. Further action against the Gypsies was made possible by government resolution No. 502/1965, which stipulated the enactment of the so-called mandatory dispersion and especially the liquidation of Gypsy communities in Eastern Slovakia. Its result was the resettlement of part of the Gypsy population and the introduction of the Gypsy problem also into Czech and Moravian towns. The specific, but nevertheless respected, autonomous order of Gypsy communities was thus disrupted even more. The last two decades completed the deprivation of the Gypsies with all the consequential

higher criminality, social parasitism, worsening health conditions, and an overall lower cultural and educational level.

The concept of the former regime's state policy toward the Gypsies failed utterly. The Gypsies have always been treated as objects of social welfare, not as subjects able to feel responsible for their own social lot. The main problem—increasing the cultural and educational level of the Gypsy population, living at a different stage of cultural development, has so far not been seriously addressed. The latest decree in force that sets guidelines for solving the Gypsy population problem in the Czech lands is the resolution of the Czech government No. 294 of 29 November 1989. The results of implementing this resolution are to be evaluated and submitted to the government of the Czech Republic at the end of 1991. On 9 April 1991, the government of the Slovak Republic approved the official policy toward the Gypsies and proposals that are to be detailed in the departments of finance, education, youth and sports, culture, and labor and social affairs. This material was worked out in cooperation with the representatives of the Romany Civic Initiative, political parties and movements, as well as with representatives of scientific research organizations. The proposal is based on the principle that Gypsies are to be given equal rights with other ethnic groups in Slovakia. Gypsies, same as other citizens, must be guaranteed social justice, social protection of the weak, the right to use their own language, the right to education, the right to develop their own culture and establish Gypsy cultural institutions, etc. Economic provisions to guarantee the needs of ethnic minorities are to be basically the same as for the rest of the population—no special funds to be earmarked for the Gypsies. A draft of state policy for the social advancement of the Gypsy population is in the planning stage also at the federal level.

Demographic Survey

The exact number of the Gypsy population on CSFR territory is not known; it is estimated at roughly 400,000 to 800,000.

Gypsy nationality has not been recognized yet, so that statistically they have always been listed under the Czech, Slovak, or Hungarian nationalities, or were included in the "other nationalities" group. A special statistical survey of Gypsy ethnic groups was carried out between 1970 and 1980 within the framework of the census. In 1980, there were 288,440 Gypsy citizens living in Czechoslovakia, which represented 1.9 percent of the total population. Based on the records of the national committees with respect to social services for the Gypsy population, there were 310,598 Gypsies living in Czechoslovakia in 1980, which is 8 percent more than indicated by the census. After 1988, these records evidenced 390,826 Gypsies. One-third of the total number of Gypsies lived in the Czech lands, the rest in Slovakia. A realistic estimate based on material processed by specialists from the CSFR Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in 1991 is that there are about 400,000 Gypsies. That amounts to 2.6 percent of the total population. The report of the Slovak Republic [SR] Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs from 1991 states that there are

253,943 Gypsies living in Slovakia (most of them in the East Slovakia Kraj—140,241). Gypsies comprise approximately 4.8 percent of the total population of Slovakia, which puts Slovakia in the first place in Europe. The total number of Gypsies in the Czech lands is estimated at 150,000 to 220,000, most of them living in the North Moravian and North Bohemian Kraj.

A census was conducted in Czechoslovakia in April 1991, but thus far its preliminary results have not thrown much light on this problem. For the first time, in accord with the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms, Gypsy nationality was also identified and independently processed. This nationality was claimed by 114,116 Gypsies in the CSFR (0.7 percent of the population), in the Czech Republic 33,489 (0.3 percent) and in the Slovak Republic 80,627 Gypsies (1.5 percent of the population). But many Gypsies, fearing persecution and discrimination in society and before the law, again claimed Hungarian, Slovak, or Czech nationality.

The Gypsy population is at the level of developing countries. From that it can be deduced that their number will double every 30 years. A Slovak Gypsy family has up to 12 children, a Czech Gypsy family four to five children. Four-fifths of the Gypsies are people up to 34 years of age, and only very few people live beyond 60 years of age.

The Gypsy Question

In the past, the problem of the Gypsies has basically not been addressed in any way. Occasional measures, such as, for example, legal obligation to work, forced resettlement in special residential blocks, blindly applied financial assistance, etc., did not help the Gypsies' situation very much. They are still living on the fringes of society. They comprise the largest part of the socially backward population (up to 80 percent in Slovakia). A considerable number of Gypsies, mainly of the older generation, are illiterate or semi-literate. The language barrier of Gypsy children when they enter school, the inability of the parents to help them in their studies, and also the generally negative attitude of the Gypsies toward education, stemming from their low educational level—all that disqualifies them from the outset. A great number of children stop attending school by the 5th or 6th grade, or are transferred to a special school. As a result, Gypsy youth are often unskilled and are encountering difficulties in today's labor market. Gypsies are mostly relegated to auxiliary labor—diggers or construction workers, women work as cleaning women, dish-washers, etc.

It is obvious that the transition to a new economic system will affect the Gypsies more than other citizens. Many Gypsies will lose their jobs as a result of their low skills, but also because of their problematic work morale, frequent changes of jobs, etc. Some will not even receive unemployment benefits because they do not meet the conditions of the applicable law. Insufficient means of livelihood also contributes to the increase in criminality. Just in the first quarter of 1991 Gypsies contributed 18 percent to the total number of criminal cases in the Czech Republic, more than 30 percent to theft, and 13 percent to murders. In

Slovakia, the share of Gypsies in recorded crimes reaches about 17 percent. In Prague, Gypsies' share in criminal activity in 1990 was 8.5 percent, which represented an increase of 13 percent over 1989. Criminal activity by Gypsy youth is also increasing. The share of young Gypsies in total criminal activity in 1990 was 21.98 percent (3,131 criminal acts).

The differences in the conditions of the Gypsy population, especially economic ones, in the two republics, lead to the migration of Gypsies from Slovakia to the Czech lands. That brings with it increased social tensions, and occasionally racial disturbances.

Some Gypsies are already showing the willingness and the effort to share in the solution of the Gypsy ethnic's condition, to cooperate with government agencies. At present there are 24 Gypsy parties, movements, and initiatives, of which the best known are the Romany Civic Initiative (ROI), Democratic Romany Association, Movement of Engaged Romanies, etc. A variety of Gypsy social and cultural organizations is being formed.

Confederation Seen Advantageous for Slovak Economy

92CH0118A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK in Slovak 11 Oct 91 p 10

[Article by Jozef Mihalik: "Slovak Economy Needs Confederation"]

[Text] The prevailing belief among Slovaks is that a considerable part of the Czech political establishment has come to the conclusion that if Slovaks do not want to live together with the Czechs in a unitary state, it means that they have lost interest in a common state and would rather see it divided into two independent states (a unitary model of a federal state is supported by 44 percent of citizens of the Czech Republic [CR], according to sociological studies). Pronouncements by the main political parties are also made in this spirit. The results of negotiations between the presidiums of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council have mostly been interpreted in Slovakia as attempts of the Czech side to preserve the unitary state.

Statements made by politicians and developments on the Czech political establishment have many economists in Slovakia worried. They are concerned about the fate of the transformation of Slovak economy and the future course of economic reform, because they are tied to the single-alternative scenario of Klaus' economic reform.

Even though the Slovak side has for some time expressed concern that Klaus' single-alternative economic reform of "a unified Czecho-Slovak economy" is insufficiently functional for the Slovak Republic [SR], the Czech side does not take that into consideration. It allows itself to be carried away by the illusions about the need to apply a unitary across-the-board solution to economic problems without regard to the specifics of the republics. It does not want to acknowledge the fact that as a result of the unitary

approach, the impact of the economic reform in Slovakia has been onerous and that the course of the reform needs correcting.

As a result, unemployment in SR is double of what it is in CR (8.7 percent in SR, while only about 3.4 percent in CR). The national income and gross national product are declining faster in SR than in CR. The social impacts accompanying the beginning of the economic transformation are much more severe in SR than in CR. In the first six months of 1991, prices for the final consumer grew by 51.6 percent in SR, while only by 48.00 percent in CR. On the other hand, incomes of SR citizens grew by 11.1 percent, and in CR by 14.4 percent. Deliveries of consumer goods, the volume of construction work, and other economic activities are declining faster in Slovakia. The state of the SR economy is rapidly deteriorating, witness the fact that 40 to 80 percent of enterprises (according to sectors) are bankrupt.

Prospects for the future economic development in SR are not favorable. According to the estimate of the Slovak Statistical Office [SSU], the number of unemployed in SR is expected to increase from the present 222,000 to between 330,00 and 350,000 people. Prices in 1991 are likely to increase on the average by 65 percent, and the standard of living decrease by about 60 to 62 percent in the year's average. It is anticipated that the produced national income in Slovakia will decline by 10 to 12 percent compared to last year.

It is not surprising that economists in Slovakia view Klaus' model of economic reform with concern and are searching for more suitable solutions.

It is objectively better to shape the process of transformation to a market economy in sovereign republics that are unrestricted by anyone, without interventions by the federal center and the other republic, and make use of the advantages of the confederation of both national states and their inclusion in the integrative trends of the EC.

The optimal solution to coexistence appears to be a confederative structure of the two states that are built on the original sovereignty, unrestricted by anything or anyone, of each national state, with agreed upon powers delegated to the confederation in the area of defense in two parts of a common army, monetary union, delimited coordination of foreign policy, and with the same standards for human and civic rights.

Powers thus formulated and delegated from the national states to the confederation can be turned over without any problems to the EC at the time the states enter the EC. At issue is, basically, deepening economic integration, acceding to a political union, agreement on a common currency, and joining the united EC defense.

The confederative line of structuring the coexistence of the national sovereign states of Czechs and Slovaks is supported at the macroeconomic level by two important facts. They are, the requirement to accelerate the transformation process of the Czech and Slovak economy, and the need to harmonize the integrative trends in both national states

with the integrative trends in the European Community, which are basically also being realized on confederative principles.

Interference by the federal center and the Czech Republic in the powers of the SR government in no way helps the transformation process of the Slovak economy. Many economists believe that it retards the economic transformation, does not contribute to independent entrepreneurial activities, and produces an aversion in Slovakia to the patronizing concern of the Czech side that Slovakia develop according to the fixed federal concepts which are demonstrably unsuited to the Slovak economy.

Klaus' line of economic reform brought about a number of conceptual and implementation problems of transforming the economy to a market system, and at the same time touched off the "war" about powersharing between the federation and the republics.

There are other versions of economic reform or its steps that are being discussed both in SR and CR. Their common denominator in applying the principles of a radical economic reform is a progress-oriented economic policy, based on a program of restructuring and modernizing industry and agriculture as a basis for the development of the construction industry. Its essential part is orientation toward competitive exports, revival of investment activity, and restoration of consumer and entrepreneurial demand. It contains measures (in the financial area) for developing a booming economy and releasing stimulating forces for restoring the macroeconomic purchasing power of the public and the enterprises, for dynamizing the domestic market, and for providing all possible support for creating a competitive business environment. It is more sensitive in its consideration of the social impact of the economic reform on the standard of living. Part of it are the inevitable interventions by the economic center to create conditions for a more efficient implementation of the economic transformation. A characteristic feature of these versions is that they take into consideration the specifics of each national economy. (Alternatives For Further Approaches to Economic Reform: the NEZES [Independent Association of Slovak Economists] alternative; alternatives devised by professors H. Koctuch, J. Mihalik, V. Komarko, M. Matejek, and others.)

The justification of an independent course for implementing the radical economic reform is manifested in the economic policy of Prime Minister Carnogusky's cabinet, which applies quite a few elements from the "Alternatives for Further Approaches to Economic Reform." They mostly concern the introduction of growth stimuli into the economy, gradual creation of a competitive business environment, mainly by actively controlling the price policy, preventing an unbearable decline in the standard of living, reviving sales by means of the budget policy, developing a pro-export policy, searching for ways to create new, useful jobs consonant with the implementation of structural changes, granting government credit guarantees for promising technologies, opening free market zones, etc.

The problems of the transformation must be solved where they occur—in the republic, community, enterprise. That leads to the question what is more effective. Whether solving them through the agency of the federation center, or at the level of a sovereign state. Negative experiences of how a federation functions, above all the CSFR, show that a sovereign national state can intervene more effectively in the economy, according to the principle "as much market as is possible and as much state intervention as is necessary." A sovereign national state knows better when and what kind of measures to pass for stimulating economic prosperity, entrepreneurial activity, and competitiveness, in order to preserve balance and stability in the national economy (in case of a crisis, maintaining, by stimulating state and private investment activity, a healthy level of unemployment, preserving the purchasing power of money, balancing the state budget, etc.). On the other hand, when there is danger of inflation, a national state, by regulating its expenditures, encouraging savings, and so on, can help to bring about optimum conditions for a balanced fiscal development commensurate with the conditions in which it finds itself. At the same time, a national state is more sensitive to when and to what extent to intervene in processes which to a decisive degree belong in market relations, such as prices, and/or in collective bargaining, such as setting wages etc.; in areas, where the market can guarantee only with difficulty the essential needs of the citizens. A national state with a better knowledge of matters balances and objectivizes the situation in the market (construction of hospitals, schools, roads, etc.). It can be said that a federal state has not proven itself in two-nation states, even if in single-nation states it can be justified up to a point.

A federal line in a two-nation state does not guarantee that the principle of free market economy with the necessary measure of government intervention by a sovereign republic can be introduced into life in a way that would be most suited to the national interests. Witness the fight for federal powers even in a situation where nonfunctional activities of many federal ministries are at stake.

It is, for example, the initiatory proposal by Federal Ministry of Economy, "Influence of the State on Oil Management During the Transition to Market Mechanism" (which resulted, in connection with the oil crisis in the Persian Gulf, in losses of many millions of korunas for SR organizations; the same as in the case of Transgas and others). A similar case is the paper of the Federal Ministry of Transportation, The Main Goals of the Transportation Ministry, in which it is stated that less than 19 percent will be spent on the reconstruction of the railway lines on Slovak territory by the year 2000. It is impossible to understand why there is no money to complete the construction of the nuclear power plant Mochovce, when there is money for Temelin. Further, we can cite the policy of federal agencies on tariffs, which does not take into account the need to protect SR goods by tariff barriers, etc.

Even though in Europe and in Czecho-Slovakia democratic changes are taking place which are fundamentally altering the substance of our existence and thinking in all

spheres of activities, it seems that in the CSFR this process is becoming "congealed," because part of the CR political scene persists in continuing with the orthodox, unitarist approach to SR. Also, because the federal and Czech one-sidedness and unwillingness to evaluate their present attitudes and decisions do not make it possible to rationally reevaluate the economic developments in SR and its position in the new state structure. The federal center and the Czech government continue to reserve for themselves the status of a reviewer, a coordinator, a benefactor to whom gratitude is due. The equal rights of Slovaks and Czechs are being ignored. Deformations and points of friction, caused by the nonsensical concept of the supposed dependence of the Slovak economy, continue to be overlooked. International relations are not sufficiently adjusted for the benefit of the discriminated-against SR.

It is as if the Czech side did not understand that in Europe and its environs there is now beginning the era of forming sovereign, independent states, and it keeps on submitting make-up corrections of the unitary model of a federal state. That is pitifully little for the Slovak nation, which, by its self-realization, wants to "challenge" itself before Europe and the world by wanting a new quality to be introduced into Czecho-Slovak relations in the sense that Slovaks will make decisions about Slovakia in all spheres of their activities.

Such ambitions of a Slovak nation of almost 5.5 million at a time when in Europe and its environs nations of two or three million are proclaiming their sovereignty one after the other, and are recognized as independent states, are proper. The Czech side must understand this. To argue in this situation that economic transformation is being slowed down is unfounded. It will put a stop to the mutual accusations, to patronizing behavior, to disinformation meant to achieve political goals and defend a unitary state that has no prospects for the future. It will manifest itself in a quicker transformation of the economies of both republics and a speedier economic reform achieved without directives and interference from the unitary center and without administrative management of the economy.

It is difficult to formulate concepts and economic policy in an atmosphere where the Czech government rejects decisions of the SR government, as happened in the case of the salary increases for educators, calling it a "dirty trick," or that the SR government "is giving out credit guarantees indiscriminately," where the federal minister of finance declares, after the decision of the SR government on the Gabčíkovo water project that is essential to Slovakia's existence, that "such effort to quickly complete the construction is nothing but an effort of the construction enterprises to get enormous sums, so that they can continue with this activity." Another minister, J. Varoušek, supports the Euroretaz demonstrators and sends them telegrams, urging them to continue the action against the completion of Gabčíkovo. P. Pithart proclaims: "We should then be rather in favor of Gabčíkovo, but I, for one, am not" (NARODNA OBRODA 16 August). The intention of the SR Economic Council to create a free trade zone in Bratislava was called by V. Klaus a conceptual

mistake and the idea of such "enclaves" a perestroika practice, etc. The effort to slow down the process of transferring powers in the economic sphere to SR agencies and efforts to give back some powers to the federal agencies, or the playing of the Hungarian card by some in the Czech political establishment, speaks for itself.

Such an approach cannot create either a national or a European economic environment that does not rely on the pressure of the central power, but on creating organizations that solve economic issues on the economic basis of mutual advantage and a system of free market relations. Liberalization of economic relations, supported by the proper sovereign national state policy without any more directions from federal connecting links, represents the way to a modern, market economy.

The way the federal center is making economic relations complicated and confusing in relation to the EC is also far removed from the rational economic thinking and modern trends toward integration in Europe and the world. According to V. Klaus, we can enter Europe only as a common state, and therefore on the European flag there can be only one star for both nations. The more modern trend rests in a simple and effective confederative system.

A confederative state structure is not an anachronism and does not belong to the last century—as is asserted by opponents of confederation. On the contrary, a confederative system now represents the newest trend for realizing the process of integration in Europe. The European integrative trends, particularly within the framework of the EC, are basically founded on confederative principles. In accord with them a free movement of people, products, services and capital within the EC framework is being realized. Beginning 31 December 1992, when the EC common market will become a reality, there will begin in Europe a new era of forming and bringing closer together nations and states. It will be a Europe of a new social dimension, a Europe of education and new technology, science, research, and further improvement of the environment. It will be a Europe in which entrepreneurship and business will be stimulated on the basis of increased cooperation of every state with everyone at the EC level. The new Europe will become a partner which will develop trade relations with other partners on the basis of an increased liberalization of world trade, especially in areas such as services (finances, postal services, telecommunications, transportation, etc.), but also in the area of public well-being which at present is not adequately addressed at the international level. An open Europe will be created in such a way that the benefits of the common market could be extended or made accessible also to other states which are not EC members. It will not be, therefore, the Europe of Masaryk's Czechoslovakist First Republic, which many Czechs idealize and in that spirit serve up the concept of the way to Europe to the Slovaks, but a new Europe, built on an association of free nations and states.

It is necessary to create a state structure that would be as close as possible to this concept of an integrated Europe. It

is logical that the system closest to it is a confederation in the form of two sovereign national states, Slovak and Czech.

Direct relations republic-EC will be objectively implemented, without any federal complications and cumbersome combinations. It is not by accident that EC specialists, who worked out the map of Europe's regions, also drew on it two Central European regions—Bohemia and Moravia, and separately Slovakia.

The EC will accept the kind of entry by the CSFR, or, as the case may be, the national republics, into the EC on which the two states will agree. Therefore it is important even now that in the problems relating to the political aspects of cooperation, questions of financial relations, creation of a free trade zone between the CSFR and the EC, free movement of people, provision of services, the

process of adjusting legislation, creation of standard-setting procedures, and other questions of relations with the EC, the Slovak republic have its own subjectivity emphasized. It is advisable that already in the preamble to the Treaty the position of SR within the framework of the CSFR be defined in the spirit of SR sovereignty. "It needs be pointed out that the EC delegation has a very constructive approach to this question and is waiting to be given specifics by the Czechoslovak delegation." (P. Mihok, plenipotentiary for negotiating and drafting the treaty between the CSFR and the EC. NARODNA OBRODA 3 September.) It is essential to talk about this so that we do not have a repeat of the year 1945, when Ursiny and Novomesky basically approved and accepted Benes's version of the concept of a Czechoslovak nation and a unitary state, which has frustrated emancipation efforts of the Slovak nation practically to this day.

Csurka on Coalition Talks, His Role in MDF

92CH0131B Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian No 43,
24 Oct 91 p 2,031

[Interview with Istvan Csurka, Hungarian Democratic Forum representative, by Tamas Forro in the television program KINN, PADON on 17 Oct: "The Hungarian Democratic Forum Could Produce a Team Like This Without Any Effort"—first paragraph is TALLOZO introduction]

[Text] The other day Tamas Forro spoke with Istvan Csurka about the coalition negotiations and about his own role. Zoltan Kiraly served as program editor.

[Forro] Soon we will have a lease here, on KINN, PADRA ["outside, on a bench"]; but there always is something to talk about with Istvan Csurka. Some claim that I am not really a good partner, because I am not rough, I do not insult and provoke you.

[Csurka] You must obey the orders of the brass.

[Forro] Well, we have not yet gotten to the point where anyone would issue orders. I usually do not insult or provoke people.

[Csurka] No, I have not experienced any particular insult or provocation here either. I had much of that elsewhere in recent times. Who cares?!

[Forro] I brought this issue up in part because you remain unchanged in your outspoken approach. If I recall correctly, the bankers were your most recent targets in VASARNAPI UJSAG.

[Csurka] Not the bankers in general, but the National Bank, and even within that the incumbent president of that institution who signed the Democratic Charter, the writing that had been produced in defense of democracy and which actually amounts to a covert writing against the government. I regard these two things as incompatible. Anyone holding such a high position in the government, under such a changed situation—a person entrusted with a rather large slice of the country's economy and who at this time wants more independence for himself and for his institution as a result of the banking law and the National Bank law—must not lower himself to the point to take such thoughtless action, in my view.

[Forro] Do not take it as an offense if I ask you this question: Did you draw this conclusion on your own? Do you reach certain conclusions simply by hearing, reading, and seeing things, or are there instances when you are the so-called lead speaker who must discuss matters like this?

[Csurka] Are you turning around the previous question whether I obey orders? No, no, thank God the truth is that many of my thoughts correspond with those of my friends, and the board and members of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum].

[Forro] Should this also be understood to mean that you call each other's attention saying that this and that has happened?

[Csurka] We converse, we negotiate and suggest ideas to each other and these writings also flow from such talks.

[Forro] Simply put: Are you the advance guard, the battering ram who first presents these issues in public, and thereafter we will see how the public and those involved react? In other words, is this some kind of a test?

[Csurka] We do not discuss such tactics. I would rather say that things had turned out this way and I am happy if I aim well and if freedom flows through the gap I opened.

[Forro] How often do you hit the target? How many times have you missed? I would be most interested in this, because we are no longer aware of the afterlives of unfounded attacks and of possible accusations.

[Csurka] I obviously err frequently, and I do not argue with this. The one who never wants to err keeps quiet. We are living in an era in which things must be carried forward, in which progress must be made; one has to experiment because the whole thing of which we are a part of is a big experiment. Precisely for this reason I believe that the number of times one errs is not of the essence; of importance is the cause one serves and the faith he has.

[Forro] This is a thankless role to play because you are constantly under attack from every direction. I would think that your party also tells you from time to time that this was a bit too strong. I would think that you also receive all kinds of deprecatory letters, as well as others that elevate Istvan Csurka to the highest levels.

[Csurka] It is wasteful to talk so much about this matter, because this has always been the case.

[Forro] You were present at the coalition negotiations. Why were these discussions necessary at this time? Shouldn't they have been going on continuously? Was there a specific reason for calling such a debate along with all the external manifestations?

[Csurka] Yes, the negotiations had been convened at the request of the Smallholders Party chairman, but no one resisted convening the meeting because such meetings were needed indeed. Expectations—and in particular, expectations raised by a large part of the press—predicted that the coalition would fall apart. This did not, and will not, happen. Connections and identical traits run far deeper between these parties. Perhaps not between the party leaders and elements that can be seen on the surface, but among the respective memberships. I visit the countryside quite frequently; I hold meetings and the Smallholders always come to those meetings just as I go to see the Smallholders. They are very decent people, they want to accomplish the same as the MDF, except that they might express things differently. This gives strength and reassurance, one feels good about it.

[Forro] You just said that the press had raised expectations. This is not true. Jozsef Torgyan raised expectations when he said outright that he would corner Jozsef Antall. This could have taken place extremely fast in this instance,

or there was no cornering at all, because the discussions ended very fast and in a very good mood.

[Csurka] One could not even talk about cornering someone at all, one could not even find a trace of such a thing in the conference room.

[Forro] What were these statements then? Bluffs, balloons, or messages? One hears such statements (which border on personal insult) on the one hand, while on the other hand some smiling people in a visibly good mood exit through the door, the same people who on the previous day or a few hours earlier called each other names. Are the people being misled?

[Csurka] I have not read these statements, I was not present at these meetings, but this does not amount to misleading the people. This most likely is part of the *panem et circenses*, i.e., bread and circuses. But these are neither promises nor threats that damage anyone. One promises an interesting performance and performs a mediocre act. That's what it amounts to.

[Forro] We simultaneously see the coalition cracking at the seams, as well as a stable coalition. What does the layman know about this? The one who does not watch the broadcasts from parliament, who does not read the lines about every motion in daily politics? Would he believe that some huge game is being played over his head, and without involving the little people?

[Csurka] Yes, but this is still a one person act.

[Forro] But are you the supporting actors in this play? You just said that the negotiations took place in response to this initiative.

[Csurka] Not to this initiative, instead he [Torgyan] wrote a letter and received a written response. He wrote to Antall and Antall replied properly, and they agreed upon a certain date. You and I have misunderstood each other very much! You are very wrong if you assume that we, the government, and Antall are able to send "messages" to each other and that some negotiations are convened as a result. No, the way this took place has been a very civilized act of convening a meeting and this has been circulated among the staffs of the three coalition parties. The Christian Democratic People's Party took a similar position regarding this issue and thus there came about a meeting.

[Forro] The MDF produced a rock solid team. Someone wrote about the MDF negotiating delegation that it shifted entirely to the right because it included Konya, Ivan Szabo, and Istvan Csurka. Why was it necessary to have such a rock solid team at the negotiations?

[Csurka] In my opinion this was not a rock solid team. Thank God, the MDF could produce a team like this without any effort. The team was not tilted to the right, it was a center-right team, a team composed normally as viewed from the standpoint of a centrist party.

[Forro] Because of these statements and happenings, has it not occurred to you [plural] to part with the Smallholders

Party as a coalition party and to form a minority government, or perhaps to look for a different coalition partner?

[Csurka] No, no, we are not thinking about things like that. We would like to see a higher degree of order in the Smallholders party, we would like to see improved cohesion, we are rooting for the representative faction. Actually, at present the representative faction beholds the kind of strength needed for leadership, that moderate hard core that adheres most to Smallholder traditions, the one that, in my view, will reorganize the Smallholders Party and will establish a party able to withstand the test of time, one that will be regarded as a reliable partner and will also be ripe for governance.

[Forro] The coalition talks continue, but will they not suffer the same fate as the six-party negotiations initiated by FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], i.e., that they will extinguish slowly and quietly?

[Csurka] This I cannot tell. The questions raised are of a kind—practical issues, the fundamental issues of the system change—that must be discussed. The process you just mentioned would by no means take place as a result of the MDF's fault.

[Forro] In other words, that these will not be superfluous, time-consuming negotiations? What should one expect as a result of these discussions? Will they produce results from which the citizens, parliament, and the coalition derive substantive benefits?

[Csurka] The coalition works better if in the course of drafting legislation representatives learn of the essence of the proposed legislation. The community as a whole will benefit if all this flows more easily and produces faster work in parliament and laws that are more clear.

Sponsor of Political Retribution Law Interviewed

92CH0144D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
29 Oct 91 p 7

[Interview with National Assembly Representative Peter Takacs by Janos T. Rac in Nyiregyhaza; date not given: "Doing Justice and Reconciliation"]

[Text] It seems that a legislative proposal entitled "Amendments to Law No. 4 of 1978 concerning the Criminal Code of the Hungarian Republic" sponsored by MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] National Assembly representatives Dr. Zsolt Zetenyi and Dr. Peter Takacs has sown the seeds of and has thus far harvested a storm. If enacted into law, a certain class of actions that were not illegal, and for which no one could be held accountable prior to the system change, would henceforth be regarded retroactively as actions subject to the authority of the Criminal Code of Laws, and those who took those actions would be held legally and morally liable by independent courts. The era in which actions subject to proceedings under the terms of the legislative proposal had been taken would begin on 21 December 1944, the day when the Provisional National Assembly had been formed, and end on 2 May 1990, the day when the new National Assembly was established.

The initiation of retroactive adjudication itself is a sensitive issue which has created a political storm in Hungarian public life. Critics at one point found an earlier writing of Dr. Peter Takacs, a candidate in historical studies at the Lajos Kossuth University of Sciences in Debrecen, which 12 years ago praised the significance of the "Great October Socialist Revolution" and the sacrifices made by the Hungarian Red soldiers of 1919, based on a publication of the Szabolcs-Szatmar County Workers Movement Historical Committee. We conversed with Peter Takacs at his Nyiregyhaza home.

[Takacs] I am a historian, and this profession involves a need to be published on occasion. Anything can be retrieved from archives, and here it is, they found even this modest paper. It did not even occur to me while working on the legislative proposal that this paper would be retrieved; I was busy doing other things. I did not count on that, but even if I did, a legislative proposal like this should be drafted.

[Rac] Why?

[Takacs] I sense that some messianic movements are bubbling at the deepest strata of society. These are nourished simultaneously by ancient history and by the fountainheads of the recent past. The first one, the legacy, is that beginning with Dozsa's peasant war to today's political struggles this nation has never been short of messianism. The fountainhead of the recent past is the fact that these movements pressure the political sphere to do justice for 1956, and, in general, for the crimes and offenses of more than four decades. Messianic processes are not well suited to do this kind of justice, and it would be damaging if these processes were entrusted to political moods and partisan emotions as long as reconciliation was indeed the goal. Precisely for this reason our legislative proposal suggests that doing justice be made the function of courts, which are entirely independent from partisan interests and politics. One could probably think of something better than that, but nothing better had occurred to me, nor could my own party or the opposition come up with something better.

[Rac] Imre Mecs and Attila Nagy had truly suffered for their actions in 1956. They said that forgiveness was the private affair of every individual. What is your view of this perception?

[Takacs] I agree. But this matter could become someone's private affair only if a law enabled everyone to decide whether the subject of a law suit was an actual offense, or an act perceived as an offense by the litigant. I believe that proceedings will be narrowed down to a very limited area. This nation does not seek revenge, I hardly believe that the several thousand people who received the 1956 medal a few days ago would stand up united and file suits. But freedom also means an opportunity to make choices; in this case it means that one may forgive, or, God forgive, that one may pursue avenues to obtain legal satisfaction. There can be no reconciliation without having this choice; views swept under the table generally swell up and become passions.

[Rac] We understand that your ominous writing of 1979 has surfaced not as a result of the workings of the press, and not even from the opposition, but from among the ranks of your own party. How did you react to this matter?

[Takacs] That is also my understanding. Look, today's party conditions are still rather pliable, the MDF itself includes at least three quasi parties. Under such circumstances both the opportunity and the temptation exists for one man to make the other observe the rules. Why should someone from my own party not feel hurt because my book review of 12 years ago had been placed on the table, or because at present I am a cosponsor of the legislative proposal? As a result of my cosponsorship I have been accused of wanting to become famous. I have become infamous, however, at most. It is unpleasant to find myself in a situation like this, but fame does not guide me in my political career. I gave my name, my knowledge, and good intentions to the transformation, but I am less well versed in late-20th-century politics than in 18th- or 19th-century conditions, which are the subjects of my historical research. But permit me to know at least this much about the present century: Even though they may discredit my name and destroy my personal credibility, I am not the one in primary need of reconciliation. Mainly society needs to reconcile itself; society must be enabled through a democratic and legal process to relax its spasms.

[Rac] As a result of ex post facto legislation, for example?

[Takacs] This would not be an ex post facto law. Our legislative proposal would not create new crimes; instead, it says that these were crimes in those days too, but at that time political circumstances prevented that justice be done under law. If such justice could be done now, it would relax anxieties, passions seen on national holidays, at meetings, and during representatives' constituent hours. The restructuring of personalities, the economy, and society would accelerate. All this could be expected as a result of doing justice in regard to a limited, relatively small group of people—a hundred and some people at most, in decision-making positions. This would remedy the countless number of old offenses and fears by creating the least amount of new offenses and fears.

[Rac] Others are already talking about several hundred people. Don't you seriously feel that irrespective of your intent, some people would be regarded as guilty who in reality are not guilty? The early 1950's also had their appointed kulaks.

[Takacs] We would like to spare society even from the smallest risk of having such a thing. During the period you just mentioned, society, the former cottar, or the new farmer who had just obtained a few acres did not call for a kulak list, but instead politics ordained such a thing in the form of a command from the top down. Even today it is worthwhile to avoid a trap in which political forces and parties put together lists of criminals pursuant to their respective interests, rather than through legal processes. If doing justice indeed becomes the function of law and of independent courts, the former party secretary, council

chairman, and, in general, the innocent Hungarian Socialist Workers Party member will have nothing to fear.

Judicial Independence Guarantees Found Wanting

92CH0126A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 2 Nov 91 pp 81-82

[Article by Endre Babus: "Legislative Proposal Concerning the Courts—Vanishing Illusions"]

[Text] Will there be an independent judiciary in Hungary, or will the government that prevails at any given point in time be able to indirectly influence adjudication? This actually is at stake in ongoing parliamentary debate concerning amendments to the 1972 law concerning the courts. As if the Antall government wanted to forget the concept of an autonomous judicial system it had voiced in 1989.

In vain did Peter Tolgyessy [Alliance of Free Democrats representative] remind ruling party representatives at last week's Constitutional Law Committee meeting about [author] Geza Feja's 1938 incitement trial. In vain did he recall the name of Judge Toreky who had sentenced the author of "Viharsarok" to a prison term and who had been appointed after the trial chairman of the Royal Hungarian Supreme Court ["Curia"]—a matter that appeared at least suspect to some, insofar as the intertwining of the government and judges had been concerned. In general, all arguments—whether on grounds of legal theory, belles-letters, or political considerations—proved to be futile in persuading representatives of the coalition parties that two years after proclaiming the republic it would be appropriate for parliament to take the epochal step of establishing institutional guarantees for an independent judiciary.

Hardly anyone doubts that the leaders of Hungarian courts and prosecutors' offices will soon be replaced. Personnel changes are hastened by ever-increasing political attacks on the administration of justice as a result of which three county court chairmen have already resigned, according to the Ministry of Justice statement to the committee. At this point the "only" big question that remains to be answered is who should elect and by what processes the leaders of courts from among aspiring candidates (and the Feja trial is also relevant to this issue).

Selecting leaders of the judiciary would not cause much headache to the Antall government if it maintained consistency with the spirit of the constitutional revolution of 1989. Two years ago there appeared to be a full understanding between reform communist and Former Minister of Justice Kalman Kulcsar and the new political forces concerning the independence of the judiciary from the executive power, i.e., independence also in personnel matters. "Judges must be represented by a judicial organization having an autonomous character and on an autonomous basis. Such organization (for example, the National Council of Judges) must enjoy full organizational and financial independence from every state organ, thus also from the Ministry of Justice," according to Zsolt Zetenyi a year and a half ago, who has become an MDF [Hungarian

Democratic Forum] representative since. The SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] shared the same view.

At the same time, however, the amendments to the 1972 law governing the courts presently before parliament suggest that the Antall cabinet is in no hurry at all to liquidate the positions of power it inherited from the party state. Thus, if enacted into law, the amendments would continue to provide a subordinate-superior character to the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the courts. Courts would not have an independent budget, but would receive funds as part of the Ministry of Justice appropriations. The minister of justice would continue to appoint the entire leadership of county courts (at least 100 persons) in the future. The 200-300 officers of local courts would also be appointed consistent with the existing system, i.e., by the chairmen of county courts that enjoy the government's confidence. Accordingly, the 1,800-person judiciary structure would continue to function on a hierarchical basis; with some exaggeration one could say that judges would continue to act as the adjudicative staff of the Ministry of Justice. This then would present a situation which in itself raised doubts about the full enforcement of the constitutional principle of an independent judiciary. Although, as presently proposed by Minister of Justice Balsai, mid-level and low-level autonomous organizations would exist in courts (e.g., county judicial councils), these would have no independent decisionmaking authority with respect to personnel, financial, or administrative matters. Their authority would extend only to commenting on proposals to be submitted to the minister.

SZDSZ criminal law expert [Representative] Peter Hack recently said that there was no justification in late 1991 for enacting a law that could have been enacted in the Hungarian People's Republic in 1989. For this reason the SZDSZ presented a 17-page counterproposal which, in their view, would establish a Hungarian judiciary independent from the executive power. The SZDSZ concept fundamentally follows the Italian, French, and Spanish patterns insofar as it would grant the power of appointing leading members of the judiciary to a 23-member body called the National Judicial Council (composed of judges and other jurists), and not to the minister of justice.

The SZDSZ model, which would establish autonomous governing bodies within courts with independent decision-making and veto powers, has been rejected by ruling party representatives and has not received support from FIDESZ. According to FIDESZ Representative Janos Ader, the SZDSZ proposal permeates a "basic democratic" ["bazisdemokrata"] mentality which, if adopted, would result in courts wasting too much energy on their own administration. At the same time, however, FIDESZ's critical comments fell short of expressing a way in which FIDESZ would fulfill its 1989 program proposal, one that rather unequivocally stated that "judges serving within a given judicial body should play a decisive role in selecting the leadership of that court."

Representatives of the ruling coalition made it clear to the opposition last Thursday that they had learned their lessons from mistakes made in the course of electing enterprise presidents and heads of hospitals. "If we once again left the election of leadership in full or in part to the organizations involved, we would once again find a majority of the previous superiors reinstated in courts," according to KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] faction leader Tibor Fuzessy. He was the only ruling party politician who permitted himself the gesture of indicating that he agreed in principle with the ideal of judicial independence, but that he did not believe that the time has come to adopt that principle in Hungarian practice.

In the aftermath of last week's Constitutional Law Committee session it is highly likely that the government will soon present a choice to the opposition: to either support the present Ministry of Justice proposal (the adoption of which requires the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority) or to select the leadership of the judiciary based on the 1972 law, which permits even less involvement by autonomous court organizations in personnel matters than the new concept. This trap appears to be unavoidable, particularly in light of last Tuesday's Constitutional Court decision, which regards as constitutional certain provisions of the 1972 law granting administrative authority over the courts to the minister of justice. At the same time, however, last week's Constitutional Court decision has failed to address issues pertaining to the appointment of court chairmen by the minister of justice or to the funding of courts through the Ministry of Justice. Whether these matters withstand future Constitutional Court scrutiny is questionable.

Emigres on Dangers of Nuclear Plant Expansion

92CH0130A Budapest KAPU in Hungarian No 10,
Oct 91 pp 56-57

[Statement issued by prominent Hungarian emigres living in the West; date not given: "Bigger Than Chernobyl"]

[Text]

Statement Concerning the Paks Giant Mania

We, the undersigned, have determined that the Electricite de France, the Hungarian Electrical Works Trust, and the Paks Nuclear Power Plant have launched a joint propaganda campaign to influence Hungarian public opinion in support of advantages provided by the expansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant. Hungarians in the West have already taken action in the past to protect national interests when those were threatened by the greed of foreign contracting firms or by the centralized and giant maniac thinking of the Hungarian energy lobby. At this time we want to establish the following facts:

(1) The aging Paks Nuclear Power Plant would become the largest nuclear power plant in all of Europe—larger than the one at Chernobyl—as a result of the planned expansion. This plant would be located in a basin surrounded by mountain ranges, at a place where earthquake hazards also exist and where needed cooling water is not in abundance

during the dry summer season. According to a brochure published by the French contractors, Hungary has already committed itself to nuclear energy; after all, in 1989, 50 percent of the country's total electrical energy output had already originated from Paks. This information is not accurate: Of the annual consumption of 37 TWh-s [expansion unknown], only 13 were satisfied by Paks.

(2) The power plant described as "clean" by the contractors would produce a tremendous amount of radioactive waste. The problems involved in depositing this radioactive waste are totally unresolved; the French contractors offer no help in waste deposit, and the cost of waste deposit is not included in their budget. This nuclear power plant is scheduled to have a 25-year life; the world's Uranium 235 reserves will suffice for about 50 years; the nuclear waste left to our descendants as a poisonous heritage would last for many centuries.

(3) The construction costs of this nuclear power plant are the highest of all nuclear power plants. Contractors believe that the expansion would cost \$3.5 billion, but this figure includes neither the storage costs of radioactive byproducts nor the demolition cost of the power plant, which is also part of the total cost. Demolition costs must be considered because concrete subject to radiation becomes fragile and therefore must be demolished. Since, in addition to initial investments, Hungary would also have to borrow funds repayable in the form of electric current, a substantial portion of pure electricity would go to others, while Hungary would be left with the danger and nuclear waste.

(4) Nuclear power plants are suited to satisfy only "basic" electrical needs. In contrast, Hungary's problems pertain to "peak" energy consumption periods. In October 1988 the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Science] already regarded the use of gas turbines as appropriate. We share the view that gas-steam turbine power/heating plants are today's cheapest yet most efficient electrical sources. Hungary has its own natural gas, it has agricultural byproducts that can be gassified, and it has coal (of which only 20 million tons are consumed, and not 20 billion, as stated by the contractors). On the other hand, Hungary no longer has uranium ore. We also share the MTA's view because the investment costs related to gas turbines amount to one-tenth of those of nuclear power plants, because due to their small size (75-299 MW) gas turbines can be built near the consumers, thus reducing the transportation costs of electrical power and the related loss. Since gas turbines can be put into service immediately, there is no need to count on a five-six year construction period, and, therefore, gas turbines produce more useful peak electricity sooner.

(5) In terms of Hungarian electrical current and energy provisions, the need calls for conservation rather than for new power plants in the next few years. The per GDP unit energy consumption in Hungary is more than double the amount of energy consumed in West Europe. Conserving energy costs far less than building new power plants. Thus, for example, changing the country's 35 million light bulbs to compact tube lamps would reduce the related electrical

energy use to one quarter of the present level, while the related expenditures would not amount to even one-tenth of the Paks construction budget. In order to confuse readers, the contractors divided our annual energy consumption not by the Hungarian GDP figure, but by multiples of that figure, thus creating a semblance as if Hungarian industry was not even wasting energy, as if conservation was not even an [alternative] solution.

(6) The contractors also used similar methods in the course of "public opinion research" that they conducted. By cleverly worded questions and by only partially reporting the responses, they made Hungarian public opinion appear to show an approval of their plan. Thus, for example, the brochure indicated that 62 percent of people residing in the vicinity of Paks felt that the nuclear power plant was safe. The reader does not learn, of course, how people residing in the vicinity of Kysthym felt. (The world learned about the Kysthym nuclear accident only a few years later because the names of certain settlements had disappeared from Soviet maps.)

For the above reasons we, the undersigned, request the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian National Assembly to provide information to the public, and not to leave information provision to contractors influenced by business considerations. We also request those who read this statement to distribute copies of it and to support the work of the Hungarian Environmental Protection Fund.

[Signed] Bela Liptak—engineer, chairman of the Hungarian Environmental Protection Fund, editor of the U.S.

Environmental Protection handbook;

Gyula Barczay—Reformed Church dean, chairman of the European Protestant Hungarian Free University;

Istvan Borsody—political writer, retired university professor;

Ede Chaszar—retired university professor;

Gyorgy Gomori—Cambridge University professor;

Peter Gosztonyi—historian residing in Switzerland;

Robert Harkay—chairman of the Hungarian House in New York;

Gyorgy Heltay—professor of history, University of South Carolina;

Agnes Janoshazi—Harvard University researcher;

Peter Juhasz—chemist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;

Ferenc Koher—head of the Hungarian Radio in New York;

Janos Lukacs—historian and writer;

Ferenc Mozsi—newspaper publisher;

Karoly Nagy—sociologist, Middlesex County College professor;

Lajos Nagy—physician, Harvard Medical School;

Peter Pasztor—history professor, Montclair State College;

Janos Polonyi—physicist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;

Gabor S. Szabo—professor of pathology, Harvard University;

Lajos Szathmary—writer, restaurant owner;

Zoltan Sztaray—writer, sociologist.

German Claims to Former Land Holdings in Gorzow

91EP0023A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 37,
15 Sep 91 p 45

[Article by Andrzej Wlodarczyk: "Solomon's Decision"]

[Text] For several months now descendants of former German farm owners in the recovered territories have been frequent guests at Gorzow offices.

"According to present day law, there is no basis to return real estate to former owners living currently abroad. Foreigners may, however, upon agreement of the minister of the interior, try to buy real estate on Polish territory, particularly if it is intended for nonagricultural use. Our authorities would like to further wide cooperation in developing joint economic enterprises by creating partnerships, joint ventures, and others."

This was the way the town and gmina authorities of Dobiegniew (Gorzow voivodship) replied recently to Alexander von Waldow, a German citizen, after having received his claim to return to him "...the title and ownership rights to the farmstead Mierzecin together with all land; that is, farm land, forests and lakes, all real estate and personal property, including all livestock and equipment." Von Walsow maintains that the estate had belonged to his family since 1720 until the end of World War II, and he presents concrete proof of that.

"Nobody among the town and gmina authorities had an allergic reaction to the claim, although we all know very well that many people are secretly afraid of the return of the Germans to our land," admits Jacek Waloch, mayor of Dobieniew. "Former land owners come here more and more often and warn they will soon return."

In the ample substantiation of his claim von Waldow adopts the stand of the so-called good farmer. He wants to save the "ruined Polish economy" while at the same time earning money himself. He mitigates his claim by explaining that only very few older Germans would be willing to resettle in their former fatherland and live in a linguistically alien environment. Young German citizens are not interested in moving to Poland either. He, himself, would only like to invest in the estate returned to him. He counts on tax and duty reductions. He also warns that "any delay in the recognition of his ownership rights can only make the burden of credits unbearable and the reclaiming of the estate for agricultural utilization unreasonable." He announces, at the same time, that he will fire the employees of the agricultural plant and cut the forest. "He will cut down everything, make a fortune, and disappear," commented a Dobniew inhabitant. He admitted he was himself afraid of losing his job.

For several months now German citizens have been frequent guests at Gorzow regional and voivodship offices. "They apply for documents confirming their ownership of farms on our territory before the war," says Zbigniew Nowacki of the regional office at Miedzzychod. "We do have documents that allow us to determine who owned

land and real estate here before the war. We have not issued, however, any documents to anybody. We are waiting for a decision from the voivodship office in Gorzow."

In the meantime, the Gorzow voivodship office does not know how to get the matter off their hands. They have forwarded the question to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They would not want to make an error. Heirs of former estate owners in Poland explain that the documents are needed by them to claim compensation for their losses from the German Government. Voivodship officers are not sure, however, if what they really want is compensation only, and not something more, like reclaiming their former ownership. The number of applications from Germany is growing, and Gorzow is patiently waiting for a Solomon's decision from Warsaw....

Ukrainian Rukh Presents Plans, Program

92EP0078A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY
in Polish No 41, 13 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ivan Drach, chairman of Ukrainian Rukh, by Wojciech Pieciak and Andrzej Romanowski in Kiev on 26 September: "Our Road Leads Through Poland"]

[Text]

[Boxed item: Ivan Drach, born in 1936, eminent Ukrainian poet, majored in Ukrainian philology at Kiev University. Expelled from that university, he completed Higher Courses in Literature in Moscow. Member of the Union of Ukrainian Writers. In the 1970's spoke out in defense of persecuted fellow writers (concerning the so-called Goncharov Affair). At the First Congress of the People's Rukh for Restructuring ("Rukh") in September 1989 he was elected its chairman. "Rukh" was formed by various independent and oppositionist groupings of the Ukraine. Drach is a deputy representing the Democratic faction at the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Republic.]

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Mr. Chairman, the independence of the Ukraine has also greatly impressed the Polish public. The Warsaw declaration of Skubiszewski and Glenko [as published] concerning the readiness of both countries to establish diplomatic relations reflects this best. It seems, however, that your independence is still more formal and declarative than genuine. The old Communist structures are bound to resist and there is also the unequivocal, to say the least, attitude of the non-Ukrainian, chiefly Russian, population, and lastly the limited growth of national awareness, especially in the villages of the eastern Ukraine, or in such regions as the Donets Basin, is a major problem. What then is the actual status of Ukrainian independence at present?

[Drach] I think that with each day this de jure independence will become more and more de facto independence. But of course that will be a long and difficult process. After all, the Ukrainian CP [Communist Party] had been one of

the leading structures in the CPSU and some of its leaders, though formally surrendering their party cards, have retained the old mentality.

Among the highly acute problems of present-day Ukraine, which you were right to mention, we should also add the huge army of 1.5 million Soviet soldiers stationed here. And it is worth noting that the independence of East Europe—of Germany, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary—was purchased at the price of some dependence of the Ukraine. That is because the Soviet troops withdrawn from East Europe get stationed in our country. Nineteen new towns have begun to be expanded to accommodate returning Soviet troops in our country. What is more, as you are aware, the Ukrainian industry was subordinated to the Soviet center. And this entire military-industrial complex is a horrible complex which had, among other things, prompted the recent Yanayev Putsch in Moscow. The shortcomings in national awareness also are true, of course. I wish to God that the situation in this respect would be what it is in Poland or Lithuania. But then on the other hand these countries had it easier in the sense of their ethnic and religious—Roman Catholic—homogeneity. With us everything is more complicated, both in religious and in ethnic terms.

But as you can see I am an optimist, because factors of a different kind promoting our statehood operate in the Ukraine. Even the old structures understand that only a Ukrainian state can result in the consolidation of the nation and the society. There is hope that a majority of the society will after all vote in favor of independence.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] You are referring to the referendum scheduled, together with presidential elections, for 1 December, are you not? What results do you expect of the referendum?

[Drach] I do not know. Formally a vote of 50 percent plus 1 would suffice. But of course that extra 1 percent is highly important to us, because if somewhere in the Lugan Region (Donets Basin—TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY) or in the Crimea the referendum yields negative results, then the absence of that 1 percent would be like a rusting nail in the body of the nation, an irritant to the existence of Ukrainian statehood. That is just why we want to do everything to increase the percentage of those who will vote for our independence and statehood.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] What if for the country as a whole the percentage will be below 50?

[Drach] That is impossible. It is simply unlikely.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Are not you apprehensive that the traditional authorities, the former Communists, would appropriate your nationalist slogans, as in Belorussia, in order to cling to rule in the country?

[Drach] Of course, such a situation is possible. But as I said, even if the former Communists solely desire power, even so they will have to work to our advantage. After all, they are aware that by opposing us they will be unable to stay in power; they understand that there is no going back

to the old structures. They are repelled by Russia because it is ruled by Yeltsin and the democrats. Lacking support in Moscow, they must willy-nilly take some steps to consolidate their position. In one way or another, they thus have to work for the sovereignty of the Ukraine.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] What is Rukh's attitude toward the Democratic Russia grouping?

[Drach] Our relations are good. When recently territorial claims were voiced by Voschchanov's circle (Voshchanov is the head of Boris Yeltsin's press center), Yuriy Afanasyev and Elena Bonner protested very heatedly. Twenty-four deputies to the Russian parliament, headed by Afanasyev, issued a special declaration on the matter; that group opposes quite actively the concept of Imperial Russia.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Is Russia without the Ukraine conceivable at all?

[Drach] Certainly, nowadays. The situation used to look dramatic when Poland or Finland fought for independence in 1918-20. At that time Russia indeed could not exist without the Ukraine. Now things are different. Of course, the one-third of farm output and one-fourth of industrial output which the Ukraine contributes to the Empire is naturally a great deal. But despite everything Russia can survive without the Ukraine. After the financial accounts are settled, which should be done through the mediation of independent Western financial institutions, the separation of our countries can be accomplished.

All this of course does not mean that Russia will not resist! It shall resist to its utmost and properly speaking it is just beginning to resist, e.g., in the economic or informational sense. Even such important news as the visit of Leonid Kravchuk, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, to the United States and Canada, has been glossed over by the Soviet media, and if they made any mention of it at all, then in an ironic, disdainful tone.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] The Russian press often points to the fact that 11 million Russians live in the Ukraine. A campaign for incorporating those territories in Russia is being promoted. Thus, does there exist the possibility that Russia might formally offer the alternative of granting independence at the price of territorial concessions?

[Drach] I do not think that the matter should be posed thus. Russian claims to our territory could be offset by our claims to the Kuban, Voronezh, and Kursk regions, or also to the so-called "Green Wedge," the Ukrainian enclave in the Far East. Thus to the 10 or 11 million Russians in the Ukraine we could oppose a like number of Ukrainians in Russia: it is like there are hostages on both sides. So then, sure, such an idiotic card could be played too but it is not worth it and I think that such a situation will not happen.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] How does Rukh view the stages by which factual independence can be reached?

[Drach] At present we have to put on the back burner various important matters relating to Rukh itself and attend to directly organizing our national independence. We are looking for the right people and observing how the local KGB is turning into a Ukrainian security service, how our ministry of defense is being formed. For example, two concepts of how the national guard should be established are being considered. Under one concept, that guard should be formed from the part of the militia subordinated to the Ukrainian authorities, while another view is that this should be done from the ground up through individual selection of candidates from among Ukrainian patriots. We thus have very many difficult problems.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] During this transition stage, does Rukh admit the possibility of a confederation with the former Soviet republics?

[Drach] Rukh is in favor of complete independence. But some forms of economic cooperation or control of nuclear weapons for a period of time are possible. Many matters are interrelated. The nuclear arms now kept in Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, or Kazakhstan, will have for some time to remain under joint command. To be sure, as an independent Ukraine, we desire to be totally free of nuclear arms.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] You want to exist as an independent, neutral, nuclear-free state....

[Drach] Yes.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Is the Rukh's approach to confederation the principal thing that differs it from the present post-Communist Ukrainian authorities headed by Leonid Kravchuk?

[Drach] Sure. Rukh is in favor of complete independence, while Kravchuk has a vision of some confederal union and champions confederal principles.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] You raised the issue of the territorial integrity of the Ukraine, of the inviolability of the present Ukrainian-Russian border. Does Rukh also support the inviolability of the Ukrainian-Polish border?

[Drach] That is so. We guide ourselves by the Helsinki principles, and that also is our aim for the future. Should we begin some border revisions, that would be a never-ending process and once again there would be horrible bloodshed. On the Polish-Ukrainian border so much blood has already been spilled that we must now consider all this carefully. Everybody should understand that a free Poland is really possible only if there is a free Ukraine. Yet it seems to me that Poles may be viewing our situation with a slight feeling of superiority. They are deluding themselves in thinking that reaching an agreement with Moscow over the head of the Ukraine would serve as an easier shortcut to Europe, i.e., to membership in the EEC. But that is not true. It is solely a Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation and agreement that can be of some significance to the specter of the Russian empire which will always crawl out regardless of whether it is Communist or democratic. The talons of that bear will always be visible.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] What do you think of the situation of the Ukrainians in Poland? Does Rukh have some claims about that?

[Drach] No, I think that we should be simply more solicitous toward each other, chiefly on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border, so as not to blow up some tiny problems which sometimes arise in the border zone, so as not to attach to them greater importance than they deserve. Because please consider that here, in eastern Ukraine, on both sides of the Dneper, people cherish many pure, fraternal feelings for Poland, for Poles, for Polish culture. These are extremely friendly, extremely great feelings.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Will Rukh try to bring about legal settlement of the status of the Polish minority and of other national minorities in the Ukraine?

[Drach] That is a must for us. Now, with your permission, let me comment a little about our diplomatic contacts, because they seem significant. Well then, we have always had extremely good relations with the Polish consul in Kiev, Mr. Ryszard Pulkowski. He on his part can also confirm that Rukh has always been well-disposed toward Poland, whether this concerned the church buildings or the recent funeral of Polish officers in Kharkov. Even on 19 August, on the first day of the putsch, when its outcome was still unknown, the Polish consul declared that his office in Kiev will grant asylum to democrats and, if the need arises, it would open an information center. The Polish consulate has always been extremely friendly toward us and ready to cooperate with us.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Last year while in New York I talked with the nestor of the Ukrainian emigres in the United States, Mr. Mirosław Prokop. He told me that he personally saw no reason why Poles should not settle in Lvov in large numbers. I must admit that such an admission from the mouth of a man born in Przemyśl and a former fighter against Poles impressed me. Is your attitude close to that of Mirosław Prokop?

[Drach] Yes, indisputably. Of course, it should be possible in both directions. The only factor to be considered is the mistrust of Uniate Catholics felt by certain circles in western Ukraine. Rumors are circulating that, supposedly, the Uniate Church wants to sell western Ukraine to the Poles and, on this basis, hostility toward both Poles and Uniate Catholics is being inspired. Thus considerable controversy is possible and that is why all these matters have to be approached very cautiously.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] Are there in Poland any political forces which the Ukrainians fear?

[Drach] We in Rukh always fear nationalism, just like you, besides. We would fear stances of the "Ukraine for Ukrainians" kind just as we would fear your slogan, "Poland for Poles." We always oppose such views. But of course, incidents do happen, although to be sure I cannot recall any recent ones so far as Ukrainian-Polish relations are concerned. Not so long ago, for example, we were visited by a delegation of the Russian intelligentsia from St.

Petersburg, and it witnessed the burning of the Russian tricolor flag by some young men, some nationalists. Of course, this may have been a provocation. But still that is oil for the fire of the nationalist mood.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] How can Poland help you? We heard in Kiev the opinion that if our government were to recognize your independence even before 1 December, before the referendum, that would help you greatly, and it would be certain to influence the results of the vote.

[Drach] That of course would be very good. Still, I think that the Poles and perhaps even Lech Walesa are psychologically not likely to do so. Consider that President Landsbergis of Lithuania once declared regretfully that unfortunately Lithuania's road to Europe does not lead through Poland. As known, Lithuania feels hurt because Poland did not grant it recognition at a time when it needed it most.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] I do not think that Poland was able to do so at the time.... One last question: What is the direction of the economic reform in the Ukraine? Could the Polish model, the Balcerowicz [shock therapy] policy, be emulated by you?

[Drach] Yes, to some extent. We must bear in mind, however, that Poland is a self-contained whole whereas the Ukraine is part of that vast imperial quagmire. The sooner—let us use this analogy—the Ukraine fences off and drains its part of the marsh, the better things will be. Thus for the present more elementary matters are much more important to us: a banking system, customs duties, our own currency. All that is obvious to Poland is still facing us. Only after that things will become normal in the sense of an open road to a free market and private ownership—the normal route for a state that wants to become part of Europe.

[TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY] And in the future perhaps also part of the European Community....

[Drach] Perhaps. In that respect we indeed want to follow the Polish road. We are aware that this road to Europe really leads through Poland—and in this sense we differ from Lithuania. May God permit this to happen.

History, Nationalism at Eastern Border Examined *91EP0023B Poznan WPROST in Polish No 36,* *9 Sep 91 pp 33-35*

[Article by Kazimierz Pytko: "To Many Ukrainians a Pole Is Still a 'Haughty Lord' With Designs on Lvov: Neighbor Relations"]

[Text] During a rally in Lithuania the following slogan appeared: "Russians to Russia, Jews to Israel, and Poles to crematoria."

Until recently the situation was simple: In the west we bordered Germany, in the east the Soviet Union. Our diplomacy could enhance the concept launched by Andrzej Micewski that Poland's relations with the neighbors on

each side should not be worse than relations between Moscow and Berlin. Today Moscow is farther away, and three new states have started shaping up at our eastern border. Anybody who has a smattering of history knows that the centuries of Polish relations with Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Bielorrussians were never easy and pleasant. Questions that for the past half-century nobody bothered to ask are being raised right now. Until now a few stereotypes sufficed; a few simple books, like Jan Gerhard's *Fire in Bieszczady* [*Luny w Bieszczadach*] or catch phrases like Mickiewicz's "Lithuania, my Motherland." At present, it became important to understand who really our neighbors are.

Ukraine: Samostijna [Independent]

Ukraine with its 52 million population is a virtual giant, comparable with France or Italy. Naturally, its economic potential does not come close to that of the western powers, but its resources and possibilities surpass them. Ukraine yields over 20 percent of the whole industrial output of the USSR and almost one third of its agricultural production. The Don Basin is one of the greatest industrial regions in the world, and the fertile soil of Ukraine hides enormous resources of iron ore and rare-earth elements. Good management of these resources would quickly allow Ukraine to be among the most powerful states of our continent. This would obviously disturb the present balance in Europe, which is the reason why reactions of various capitals to Ukraine's declaration of independence are so different from reactions to the independence aspirations of the Baltics.

The size of the republic in itself is of particular importance since it covers 603 thousand square kilometers, which is twice the size of Poland.

Ukraine's secession would mean a definite end to the USSR. It would also weaken Russia's position. Borys Jelcyn's warnings as to Moscow's right to revise the borders were directed first of all at Kijev. The threat of losing Ukraine is stirring a virtual uproar among Russian nationalists. Even Aleksandr Solzenicyn, who has fully endorsed the secession of the Baltic and Asian republics, maintains a hard stand in the case of Ukraine. "Our nation," he wrote, "divided into three branches only after the horrible tragedies of the Mongol invasions and Polish colonization. Not so long ago the falsehood appeared that a separate Ukrainian nation, using a distinct non-Russian language, existed already from the beginning of the ninth century. We all descend from the invaluable Kijev where, according to Nestor's chronicles, 'the soil began to be Russian.'"

Ukrainians, however, are of a different opinion. For them, the beginning of their statehood is Kijev, destroyed by invasions of Mongols, Lithuanians and Poles. A short period of independence is connected with the name of the national hero, Bohdan Chmielnicki. This dramatic episode ended in 1699 with a peace treaty at Karlowice, which divided Ukraine between Poland and Russia. After the partition of Poland almost the whole of Ukraine got under the rule of the Tzars, who did not recognize the separateness of its inhabitants. The new subjects received an

explanation that the name Ukraine comes from the words "u kraja," meaning "at the border" of Russia. Eventually even these attempts to rationalize imperial appetites were given up and Ukraine became Little Russia.

After World War I it became an area of bloody fights among Ukrainians, Poles, "white" Russians, and bolsheviks. The first round was won by Moscow and Warsaw; Poland got Western Ukraine, the USSR the rest. Stalin, in a way peculiar to himself only, broke the back of Ukrainian nationalism. He caused a famine that killed 5-10 million peasants, and he murdered almost the entire intelligentsia. Trains passing through Ukraine had to have windows blocked to prevent passengers from seeing hundreds of corpses lying along the railroad.

The second round of fighting took place in 1939, when the western part of Ukraine was also taken over by the USSR. This region avoided the bolshevik terror of the thirties, which is why rather strong nationalism survived there. The Polish Republic was not a very good mother to its eastern children but its heavy hand could not even be compared to the iron fist of the communists.

The different fate of the two parts of the Ukraine has effected the differences in present days. The wave of independence claims moved from the west to the east. In the first free elections, independence groups won in Lvov, Tarnopol and Ivanofrankowsk (Stanislawow). In the highly Russian east, communists were still the winners.

Today, after the disintegration of the communist party, there is no power that could stop the independence claims of the Ukrainians. The results of the December referendum are totally predictable.

For Poland the situation became particularly unpleasant because the nationalism of the most politically developed part of Ukraine was directed not against Russia but against the Second Polish Republic. Ukrainian intelligentsia has strongly involved itself in eliminating prejudices that had grown for centuries, but it is a known fact that prejudices live longest not among elites, but in the minds of the most simple. For them a Pole is still a "haughty lord," with designs of his own for Lvov.

Lithuania: From Jagiello to Landsbergis

According to Pawel Jasienica the marriage between Wladyslaw Jagiello and Queen Jadwiga was the beginning of disasters to the Polish Crown, which turned away from Western civilization and engaged into conflicts with the growing power of Moscow. Past glory dwindled and Poland irrevocably lost its position as a European power. Lithuania became a small republic.

Lithuania, similarly to other Baltic republics, played an important role in the imperial politics of Moscow. It gave Moscow strategic access to the sea and outreach to Europe. In 1919, after the geopolitical changes caused by the first world war, Moscow made an attempt to regain the Lithuanian territory. Everything happened according to a standard script. First, a Provisional Worker-Peasant Government was created and then a Soviet Congress was called,

which made a decision to create a Lithuanian-Bielorussian Socialist Republic, designated with the charming acronym "Litbiel." At that point Poland entered the game as well as some independent Lithuanian groups. We know the results, Vilnius found itself within the borders of the Second Polish Republic, and Kowno became the capital of the independent republic.

What Lenin could not accomplish, Stalin did in a treaty with Hitler. In 1940 Lithuania found itself within the borders of the USSR. In spite of repressions and mass deportations, the communists did not succeed in suppressing the Lithuanian sense of identity. In 1991 Lithuania regained its statehood and found itself at our borders.

Skeptics doubt in the possibility of independent existence of this small state. Its textile industry, its light and electro-technical industry is, according to western criteria, outdated. There are practically no natural resources except forests.

Optimists believe that it is exactly the small size and the small population that are the strength of Lithuania. It is much easier for a small country to reform itself and adapt to market economy than it is for a giant like Russia or Ukraine. Additional assets are close relations with Estonia and Latvia, which will allow the fairly easy creation of a united economic region. President Landsbergis believes that the Baltics' role is that of an intermediary between the East and the West.

Other countries also aspire to this role, among them Poland. It is easy to envision the seeds of future conflicts, since past sentiments have not disappeared yet. During a "Sajudis" rally a banner was held with the following slogan: "Russians to Russia, Jews to Israel, Poles to crematoria." This was, clearly, instigated by provocateurs, but the anti-Polish attitudes in Lithuania must not be disregarded. We must not forget that Lithuanian historians paint a totally different picture of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. In their view, moving the capital to Wawel was detrimental to Vilnius' interests, making it impossible to conduct a policy of national interests. Moreover, it caused an almost total polonization of the upper strata of society and inhibited a natural development of Lithuanian national statehood. Lithuanians are convinced that in a clash with Russian culture they would have been able to defend their identity; entering the sphere of Polish culture, closer to the Western, did not offer that chance. It is not without reason that Lithuanian intelligentsia, even today, speaks better Polish than Russian.

Bielorussia: Homeland of Kosciuszko

For an average Pole Bielorrussia is a white spot on the map. Knowledge of this country is close to zero. Meanwhile, history bound our fates closely together. The major part of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, united with the Polish Crown, was not Lithuania itself but the flat, empty, and poor Bielorrussia. National identity among its inhabitants

was almost nonexistent. And no wonder, the great aristocratic families and rich nobility quickly polonized themselves, while the poor peasants kept their language and religion.

After World War I, communists immediately took care of Bielorussia's fate. The failure of the "Litbiel" concept inspired them to proclaim the independence of Bielorussia itself, which immediately after adopting its constitution declared its desire to join the federation with Soviet Russia. The Polish-Russian war and the Riga treaty frustrated that attempt, as Warsaw got the western part of the republic. Again, as in the case of Ukraine, in the clash with strong Poland, Bielorussian nationalism grew stronger. In the Soviet part Stalin consistently eliminated any signs of separatism.

Pieriestroika, initiated by Gorbachev, did not have great effects on Bielorussia. The communist regime took care of people's most elementary needs and kept its strong rule. It was the failed coup attempt in Moscow that finally radicalized attitudes. Bielorussia proclaimed its independence on 25 August. It is suspicious, however, that the declaration was adopted unanimously by the parliament dominated by the communists. Was it a tactical move only?

Among all the European republics of the USSR, Bielorussia has the slightest chance for an independent political and economic existence. It lacks natural resources, soil there is not fertile, the communication network on the swampy plains is inadequate, the industry is equally weak and unable to compete on world markets, and the society is completely unprepared for the requirements of a market economy. If rationalism prevails, Bielorussia will keep its close ties with Russia or the remains of the USSR; if not, we will have another difficult neighbor. The first sign of trouble appeared during the visit of minister Skubiszewski in Minsk, when the signing of the mutual relations declaration failed to take place. Primate Glemp's visit to Bielorussia raised angry voices of those who identify Catholicism with Polishness and refuse to have contacts with either.

Krolewicz: In the City of Kant

In 1945, after the elimination of Prussia, the USSR incorporated a small piece of land with Koenigsberg (Krolewicz) within its borders. It was given the name of one of the heroes of the bolshevik revolution, Kalinin. For the past half-century the Russians had used this piece of land to block the Baltic, keeping it from foreigners.

Recent years changed its role slightly. Aware of Polish fears of Germans, Moscow used it as a bugaboo against us. Suggestions were made that the Volga Germans should be resettled in Kaliningrad, who could then join their brothers from across the Oder in keeping us between two fires.

Today the situation is diametrically different. Thanks to the Krolewicz region, Poland has a border of a few kilometers with the Russian Federation. Intentions of the new authorities at the Kreml regarding this territory are unknown. It is not likely that, in the present circumstances,

it would be used in a game with Warsaw. The enclave, cut off from Russia, may play the role of a Russian Hong Kong. It may, as suggested by Prof. Brzezinski, develop into a duty-free zone, serving not only Russia, but also Poland and even Lithuania.

[Box, p 34]

LITWA

Territory: 65,000 square kilometers. Population: 3,450,000 (Lithuanians—80 percent, Russians and Bielorussians—9 percent, Poles—7 percent). Economy: electrotechnical and machine industry, food processing based on local resources. Natural resources: none.

BIELORUSSIA

Territory: 207,000 square kilometers. Population: 9,900,000 (Bielorussians—80 percent, Russians—10 percent, Poles—6 percent). Economy: lumber, textile, electrotechnical, and tool industries; well-developed food processing. Natural resources: none.

UKRAINE

Territory: 603,700 square kilometers. Population: 51,700,000 (Ukrainians—73 percent, Russians and Bielorussians—21 percent, Poles—0.9 percent). Economy: heavy industry and mining, well-developed agriculture, crops and husbandry. Natural resources: large deposits of iron ore and coal.

[Box, p 34]

Politics or Emotions?

During the past year, whenever Polish-Ukrainian relations were discussed, they certainly were not occurring in Warsaw or in Kiev. Emotions and prejudices in Lvov and Przemyśl took over.

This marginalizing of politics was possible because of the shortsightedness of both governments, Ukrainian and Polish, visible at least until the failed coup of Janajev. Minister Skubiszewski's visit to Ukraine and the signing of a treaty with this republic have taken place, but there were virtually no practical results of it (only propaganda). The August coup gave particular importance to the issue of Ukraine's independence. It happened so rapidly that even deputies declaring independence were surprised by the quick turn of events.

Kijev, and especially its political elites, were not prepared for such an eventuality. No concept of foreign policy was worked out yet. The problem of Polish-Ukrainian relations did not exist in Kijev.

Unfortunately, the Polish Government did not pick up the issue, in spite of the fact that the disintegration of the USSR was only a matter of time (and money). Before the war, the greatest political disputes in our country were related to the shape of our relations with the East (Pilsudski's federation concept against Dmowski's incorporational). Today, in the program of any large Polish party,

except some empty slogans, we will not find statements addressing relations with our eastern neighbors.

The shortsightedness of politicians made it possible for the brunt of the problem of Polish-Ukrainian relations to move to Przemyśl and Lvov. "The true Catholics" did not allow the ingress of Bisop Martyniuk at the Karmel in Przemyśl because he is "Greek Orthodox and Ukrainian." In retaliation, the ingress of archbishop Jaworski in Lvov was prevented because he is "Roman Catholic and Polish." In this conflict even the pope, in spite of his great gesture, did not prove to be an adequate authority.

Parliamentary Elections: Losers, Winners Reviewed

92EP0069A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 45,
9 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by Janina Paradowska: "Old and New Parliament, Personal Particulars"]

[Text] Two hundred deputies of the 10th term of the Sejm ran for the credentials of deputies of the new Sejm. One hundred and thirteen individuals, mainly from the Democratic Union, the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left, and the Polish Peasant Party, won these credentials. There were no particular surprises.

The voters were not kind to the Presidium of the Sejm. Only Deputy Marshal Olga Krzyżanowska did not have problems getting a mandate. Marshal Mikołaj Kozakiewicz received a mandate due to the existence of all-Polish lists because he was defeated in a Warsaw district. Deputy Marshals Teresa Dobielinska-Eliszewska and Tadeusz Fiszbach lost the elections.

It will be possible to recreate the Panel of Seniors of the 10th term in the new Sejm (for now, a debate is on about numbering—whether this is to be the Sejm of the 1st term of the Third Republic or the Sejm of the 11th term). The leaders of the largest clubs became deputies, though some changed their party colors. The following are now in the Sejm: Mieczysław Gil—the last chief of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club], Bronisław Geremek—UD [Democratic Union], Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz—the PKLD [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left], Józef Zych—PSL [Polish Peasant Party], Wiesława Ziolkowska—PKP [Labor Parliamentary Club], and Ryszard Bugaj—Labor Solidarity. The clubs of the Democratic Party, the PAX [Christian Social Association], the Christian Social Union, or such curiosities as the club of independents will disappear, at least for now. It is not known at present how individual deputies from various tickets will unite.

The main pressure groups in the Sejm may also be recreated without difficulties. The most boisterous of the peasant deputies received their mandates without a problem. Among others, the following became deputies: Jacek Soska (sought a vote of no confidence for Prime Minister Bielecki twice, as well as the discontinuation of talks on association with the EEC), Włodzimierz Wiertel (the favorite deputy of Adam Michnik), and Zbigniew

Mierzwia (poetry in speeches and the desire to lead a march on Warsaw by Galician peasants). If we examine the stenographic records of so-called peasant lamentations in the 10th term it will turn out that all participants in them are in the new Sejm.

All of them won in the districts and did not have to wait for the distribution of seats on the all-Polish lists, as not only Mikołaj Kozakiewicz but also Aleksander Luczak had to do. As we can see, moderation in speech was not appreciated by peasant voters.

The antiabortion lobby was unquestionably successful in the elections. Anna Knysok, Jan Lopuszanski, Marek Jurek, and Stefan Niesiolowski may count on the support of Jan Switek (the only SD [Democratic Party] deputy who tried to submit a draft law on the legal protection of conceived children for consideration even at the next to last meeting of the 10th term,) indefatigable Senators Alicja Grzeskowiak, Walerian Piotrowski, and Leszek Piotrowski, as well as many old and new colleagues. The environment for the antiabortion law in the new Sejm will be extremely favorable.

All the greatest opponents of the so-called Balcerowicz plan, and of the deputy prime minister personally, ended up in the Sejm. We should mention primarily in this instance not only the present deputies we have already referred to, but also of those coming from the PKLD and Labor Solidarity headed by Ryszard Bugaj. This pressure group was greatly reinforced. Only 62 deputies of the Union and 37 deputies of the Liberal Democratic Congress are promising to advocate the direction of reforms to date, though with corrections. Three-quarters of the Sejm are anti-Balcerowicz.

By the end of the 10th term, a women's lobby began to emerge which was inspired by Anna Dynowska and Barbara Labuda. A. Dynowska did not run in the elections. B. Labuda did get a seat. Taking her energy into account, the women's lobby should be expected to survive, especially once the opponents of abortion join the battle.

Deputies comprising so-called rapid deployment forces, i.e. those who were committed to battle when it came to stormy debates, came to the new Sejm almost to a man (provided they ran). Adam Michnik and Sławomir Wiatr will be greatly missed in the ranks of the rapid deployment forces. The following were elected: Józef Oleksy (substantive arguments) and Janusz Szymanski (putting his opponents in place though procedural means) from the PKLD, Jacek Kuron, Jan Maria Rokita, and Bronisław Geremek from the Union, Andrzej Kern, Stefan Niesiolowski, and Jan Lopuszanski from the OKP, and Józef Zych from the PSL.

They may not be successful at creating a progovernment majority, but the progovernment lobby in the Sejm will certainly be strengthened. This lobby grew weaker under Prime Minister Bielecki; very few individuals were ministers and deputies simultaneously. The prime minister himself, the chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, the minister, and a deputy minister of national defense,

did not amount to much. Now, that the leading figures of all major groups (actually both the first and the second echelon) have become members of the Sejm, the government will have to be recruited mainly from among the deputies.

The presence in the Sejm of political elites from all significant groups is an important change compared to the 10th term, when the elites of the so-called governing coalition were eliminated due to the national lists, whereas new elites were just emerging, and as time went by, formed a very vociferous extra-parliamentary opposition. However, those who expected this opposition to come to the Sejm in great numbers were mistaken. Only the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] and the UPR [Union for Real Politics] managed to accomplish this. The following are still not represented in the parliament: The PPS [Polish Socialist Party] (figures such as Jan Mulak, Andrzej Malanowski, and Piotr Ikonowicz were defeated), the Freedom Party of Kornel Morawiecki, all factions of the National Democrats (Senator Jan Zamoyski is the only representative of the National Democrats), the Republicans, the Conservative-Liberal Party, and many other pocket-sized parties. Zbigniew Bujak got only one person, himself, to the Sejm from the Democratic Social Movement, thus confirming that the Democratic Social Movement is Bujak's party. However, we can state without exaggeration that not a single leading politician lost in the election personally. If they failed to win a seat in a district, all-Polish lists came to the rescue. Due to such lists, the Democratic Union brought to the Sejm former CUP [Central Planning Administration] chief Jerzy Osiatynski; Marek Dabrowski, former deputy minister of finance; as well as Marek Chalonski, deputy chairman of the parliamentary club. Due to the national lists, the PC [Center Accord] guaranteed seats at Wiejska Street to functionaries such as Marek Dziubek (the head of the PC faction in the Sejm to date), Marcin Przybylowicz, Andrzej Urbanski (editor in chief of *EKSPRES WIECZORNY*), Slawomir Siwek, and Wojciech Wlodarczyk (secretary of the Advisory Committee of the President).

In turn, various famous personalities from the world of culture, science, journalism, or sports, who were supposed to lure voters, lost the elections. Only nonparty member Professor Aleksander Krawczuk was useful for the Alliance of the Left in Krakow; Bronislaw Cieslak and Lieutenant Borewicz were not. Coach Kazimierz Gorski and fencer Ryszard Parulski were of no use to the National Democrats. The Polish Party of Beer Lovers will be represented by Janusz Rewinski, but actor Stefan Friedman lost. There will be no large group of journalists at Wiejska Street either. Andrzej Krzysztof Wroblewski, Andrzej Halicki (KLD [Liberal Democratic Congress]), and Lech Dymarski (PC) will not be there. Sociologists Pawel Spiewak and Ireneusz Krzeminski (KLD) were not successful either. The community of journalists will be represented in the Sejm by Donald Tusk, Andrzej Zarebski (KLD), Jozefa Hannelowa, Iwona Katarasinska, Juliusz Braun (UD), Jozef Orzel, Andrzej Urbanski, Jacek Maziarzski, Maciej Zalewski (PC), Marek Siwiec (SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left]), and Krzysztof Krol (KPN).

Despite an antigovernment sentiment, which prevailed during the campaign, the results of voting do not indicate a marked tendency to "cut out" the members of the government. The prime minister was indisputably successful, winning elections in Warsaw against, among others, the most popular politician Jacek Kuron. The minister of ownership transformation and the spokesman of the government won their seats in the districts, along with deputy ministers Joanna Starega-Piasek and Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Ministers Michal Boni and Krzysztof Zabinski and deputy minister Bronislaw Komorowski had to use all-Polish lists. Ministers of education of the two Solidarity governments, Henryk Samsonowicz and Robert Glebocki, lost the elections (they ran for the Senate). Minister Ewaryst Waligorski did not become a deputy. From among the advisers of the prime minister, Pawel Piskorski (youth affairs) was elected in a district, and Lech Mazewski (regionalization) was elected on an all-Polish list.

The Presidential Chancellery of the Republic of Poland won many seats. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Lech Kaczynski, Slawomir Siwek, and Teresa Liszcz became deputies. Arkadiusz Rybicki and Ludwik Dorn were not elected to the Sejm, and Jerzy Grohman was not elected to the Senate. From among the ranking officials of the chancellery, Professor Janusz Ziolkowski (currently a senator) and Piotr Szczepaniak did not run in the elections. After the elections, the two retained their positions, whereas others left at their own request or were dismissed. It is possible to say that at present there are prominent vacancies in the chancellery. This was where changes in the machinery of power began after the elections. So far, the movement has been in one direction—positions have been vacated. This is the beginning of many personnel reassignments that are yet to come.

Sejm Deputies Listed by Party Affiliation

92EP0069B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
31 Oct-1 Nov 91 p 5

[Unattributed article: "A List of Deputies"]

[Text]

Democratic Union

Jerzy Kopania (Bialystok),
Grazyna Staniszevska (Bielsko-Biala),
Maria Zajackowska (Bydgoszcz),
Helena Goralska (Czestochowa),
Olga Krzyzanowska (Gdansk),
Aleksander Hall (Gdansk),
Jozef Meisel (Gliwice),
Andrzej Potocki (Gliwice),
Zygmunt Kufel (Gorzow-Pila),
Jan Kisiliczek (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Tadeusz Pokrywa (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Andrzej Pawlowski (Kalisz),
Irena Lipowicz (Katowice),
Piotr Polmanski (Katowice),
Janusz Braun (Kielce),
Joanna Starega-Piasek (Konin),

Jan Krol (Koszalin),
Jozefa HenneLOWa (Krakow),
Jan Maria Rokita (Krakow),
Tadeusz Syryjczyk (Krakow),
Janusz Onyszkiewicz (Krosno-Pzemysl),
Ryszard Setnik (Lublin),
Maria Dmochowska (Lodz),
Iwona Sledzinska-Katarasinska (Lodz),
Stanislaw Zurowski (Nowy Sacz),
Mariusz Wesolowski (Olsztyn),
Andrzej Bober (Olsztyn),
Kazimierz Szczygieski (Opole),
Jan Piskorski (Ostroleka),
Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Poznan),
Hanna Suchocka (Poznan),
Wladyslaw Raiter (Piotrkow),
Anna Urbanowicz (Plock-Skierniewice),
Piotr Nowina-Konopka (Radom),
Wladyslaw Liwak (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Pawel Zalewski (Siedlce),
Jerzy Zdrada (Sosnowiec),
Marek Balicki (capital city),
Jozef Kowalczyk (Szczecin),
Wlodzimierz Puzyna (Szczecin),
Gwidon Wojcik (Tarnow),
Jan Wyrowinski (Torun-Wloclawek),
Jan Litynski (Walbrzych),
Jacek Kuron (Warsaw),
Bronislaw Geremek (Warsaw),
Andrzej Wielowieyski (Warsaw),
Wladyslaw Frasyuniuk (Wroclaw),
Radoslaw Gawlik (Wroclaw),
Barbara Labuda (Wroclaw),
Henryk Wujec (Zamosc),
Tomasz Szczepula (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Alliance of the Democratic Left

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (Bialystok),
Janusz Szymanski (Bialystok),
Ewa Spychalska (Bielsko-Biala),
Janusz Zemke (Bydgoszcz),
Anna Bankowska (Bydgoszcz),
Marek Boral (Czestochowa),
Longin Pastusiak (Gdansk),
Waclaw Martyniuk (Gliwice),
Marek Borowski (Gorzow-Pila),
Tadeusz Jedrzejczak (Gorzow-Pila),
Irmino Bochen (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Jerzy Szmajdzinski (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Marek Siwiec (Kalisz),
Barbara Blida (Katowice),
Czeslaw SleziaK (Katowice),
Wladyslaw Adamski (Kielce),
Wojciech Saletra (Kielce),
Irena Nowacka (Konin),
Ryszard Ulicki (Koszalin),
Aleksander Krawczuk (Krakow),
Bronislaw Bajor (Krosno-Przemysl),
Izabella Sierakowska (Lublin),
Zbigniew Kaniewski (Lodz),
Leszek Miller (Lodz),

Tadeusz Iwinski (Olsztyn),
Marian Kozlowski (Olsztyn),
Jerzy Pilarczyk (Opole),
Zbigniew Siemiatkowski (Ostroleka),
Anna Dudkiewicz (Piotrkow),
Wanda Sokolwska (Plock-Skierniewice),
Andrzej Baraniecki (Poznan),
Krystyna Lybacka (Poznan),
Leszek Bialy (Radom),
Jerzy Jaskiernia (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Jozef Oleksy (Siedlce),
Ireneusz Sekula (Sosnowiec),
Andrzej Szarawarski (Sosnowiec),
Wieslaw Kaczmarek (Capital City),
Jacek Piechota (Szczecin),
Kazimierz Nowak (Torun-Wloclawek),
Marian Zenkiewicz (Torun-Wloclawek),
Czeslaw Sterkowicz (Tarnow),
Bogumil Zych (Walbrzych),
Aleksander Kwasniewski (Warsaw),
Jerzy Wiatr (Warsaw),
Jozef Kaleta (Wroclaw),
Marek Mazurkiewicz (Wroclaw),
Ryszard Bartosz (Zamosc),
Tadeusz Bilinski (Zielona Gora-Leszno),
Zbigniew Gorzelanczyk (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Polish Peasant Party—Program Alliance

Stanislaw Sienkiewicz (Bialystok),
Jozef Cinal (Bielsko-Biala),
Wladyslaw Serafin (Czestochowa),
Slawomir Szatkowski (Gdansk),
Zenon Witt (Gorzow-Pila),
Jozef Pawlak (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Tadeusz Sytek (Kalisz),
Leszek Bugaj (Kielce),
Wlodzimierz Wiertelk (Kielce),
Zdzislaw Domanski (Konin),
Wojciech Zarzycki (Konin),
Zbigniew Galek (Koszalin),
Andrzej Bajolek (Krakow),
Zbigniew Mierzwa (Krosno-Przemysl),
Wladyslaw Wrona (Krosno-Przemysl),
Marian Starownik (Lublin),
Bogdan Lukasiewicz (Lodz),
Bronislaw Dutka (Nowy Sacz),
Witold Bialobrzewski (Olsztyn),
Marek Domin (Olsztyn),
Andrzej Borowski (Opole),
Piotr Barcinski (Ostroleka),
Stanislaw Zelichowski (Ostroleka),
Roman Jagielinski (Piotrkow),
Tadeusz Gajda (Plock-Skierniewice),
Waldemar Pawlak (Plock-Skierniewice),
Stanislaw Kalemba (Poznan),
Jozef Lochowski (Radom),
Aleksander Bentkowski (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Jan Majewski (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Ryszard Smolarek (Siedlce),
Franciszek Stefaniuk (Siedlce),
Jacek Soska (Sosnowiec),

Janusz Piechocinski (capital city),
Zbigniew Woroszczak (Szczecin),
Jan Szczepanik (Torun-Wloclawek),
Ryszard Jastrzebski (Walbrzych),
Janusz Maksymiuk (Wroclaw),
Jan Kowalik (Zamosc),
Janusz Mackowiak (Zielona Gora-Leszno),
Jozef Zych (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Catholic Electoral Campaign

Halina Strebska (Bialystok),
Aleksander Usakiewicz (Bialystok),
Bogumil Boba (Bielsko-Biala),
Grzegorz Schreiber (Bydgoszcz),
Jozef Blaszczyk (Czestochowa),
Feliks Pieczka (Gdansk),
Alojzy Szablewski (Gdansk),
Jadwiga Rudnicka (Gliwice),
Jerzy Hrybacz (Gorzow-Pila),
Antoni Dzierzynski (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Maciej Srebro (Kalisz),
Grzegorz Kazimierski (Katowice),
Adam Lukomski (Kielce),
Tomasz Szyszko (Konin),
Zbigniew Dyka (Krakow),
Stanislaw Zajac (Krosno-Przemysl),
Jerzy Kropiwnicki (Lodz),
Stefan Niesiolowski (Lodz),
Stanislaw Rakoczy (Nowy Sacz),
Wieslaw Chrzanoski (Lublin),
Halina Nowina-Konopka (Olsztyn),
Jan Piatkowski (Opole),
Tadeusz Godlewski (Ostroleka),
Waldemar Modzelewski (Ostroleka),
Kazimierz Pekala (Ostroleka),
Stanislaw Stando (Piotrkow),
Mariusz Marasek (Plock-Skierniewice),
Piotr Walerych (Poznan),
Marian Kepka (Radom),
Jan Lopuszanski (Radom),
Adam Matuszczak (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Waldemar Sikora (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Marian Pilka (Siedlce),
Henryk Boryszewski (capital city),
Stanislaw Wadolowski (Szczecin),
Mariusz Grabowski (Tarnow),
Jerzy Matyjak (Torun-Wloclawek),
Teresa Bazala (Walbrzych),
Antoni Macierewicz (Warsaw),
Ryszard Czarnecki (Wroclaw),
Jerzy Michalak (Zamosc),
Marek Jurek (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Center Citizens Accord

Krzysztof Putra (Bialystok),
Jozef Kania (Bielsko-Biala),
Antoni Tokarczuk (Bydgoszcz),
Andrzej Kostarczyk (Czestochowa),
Czeslaw Nowak (Gdansk),
Czeslaw Sobierajski (Gliwice),
Jozef Orzel (Gorzow-Pila),

Maciej Zalewski (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Boleslaw Twarog (Katowice),
Edward Rzepka (Kielce),
Pawel Kotlarski (Konin),
Zdzislaw Dubiella (Koszalin),
Kazimierz Barczyk (Krakow),
Tadeusz Gorczyk (Krosno-Przemysl),
Teresa Liszcz (Lublin),
Andrzej Kern (Lodz),
Lech Kaczynski (Nowy Sacz),
Edmund Krasowski (Olsztyn),
Andrzej Andrysiak (Opole),
Stanislaw Weglowski (Ostroleka),
Przemyslaw Hniedziewicz (Plock-Skierniewice),
Roman Andrzejewski (Poznan),
Tadeusz Kowalczyk (Radom),
Jacek Bujak (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Krzysztof Tchorzewski (Siedlce),
Marek Lasota (Sosnowiec),
Antoni Bielewicz (capital city),
Jacek Maziarski (capital city),
Janusz Choinski (Tarnow),
Bartolomiej Kolodziej (Torun-Wloclawek),
Jerzy Eysymontt (Walbrzych),
Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Warsaw),
Jan Olszewski (Warsaw),
Adam Glapinski (Warsaw),
Adam Lipinski (Wroclaw),
Cezary Piasecki (Zamosc),
Roman Bartoszcze (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Confederation for an Independent Poland

Waldemar Polczynski (Bialystok),
Adam Sengebusch (Bydgoszcz),
Jozef Synowiec (Czestochowa),
Piotr Aszyk (Gdansk),
Andrzej Andrzejczak (Gliwice),
Robert Tromski (Gorzow),
Krzysztof Blazejczyk (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Przemyslaw Sytek (Kalisz),
Adam Slomka (Katowice),
Janusz Koza (Kielce),
Marek Michalik (Konin),
Miroslaw Lewandowski (Krakow),
Leszek Moczulski (Krakow),
Andrzej Mazurkiewicz (Krosno-Przemysl),
Krzysztof Kaminski (Lublin),
Dariusz Wojcik (Lublin),
Andrzej Terlecki (Lodz),
Henryk Opilo (Nowy Sacz),
Michal Janiszewski (Olsztyn),
Krzysztof Popena (Opole),
Mieczyslaw Pawlak (Ostroleka),
Andrzej Rychlik (Piotrkow),
Michal Tokarzewski (Plock-Skierniewice),
Wojciech Pegiel (Poznan),
Dariusz Sonta (Radom),
Zygmunt Lenyk (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Jan Misikowski (Siedlce),
Tomasz Karwowski (Sosnowiec),
Jaroslaw Wartak (Sosnowiec),

Zbigniew Adamczyk (capital city),
Zbigniew Brzycki (Szczecin),
Leszek Golba (Tarnow),
Elzbieta Michalak (Torun-Wloclawek),
Adam Marek Zieminski (Walbrzych),
Krzysztof Krol (Warsaw),
Wincenty Pycak (Wroclaw),
Andrzej Chmiel (Zamosc),
Iwona Zakrzewska (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Liberal Democratic Congress

Dariusz Boguski (Bialystok),
Jan Pamula (Bielsko-Biala),
Marek Koczwarra (Bydgoszcz),
Dariusz Kolodziejczyk (Czestochowa),
Tadeusz Bien (Gdansk),
Donald Tusk (Gdansk),
Jaroslaw Ulatowski (Gdansk),
Boguslaw Chojna (Gliwice),
Marek Moszczynski (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Andrzej Raj (Katowice),
Jan Rzymelka (Katowice),
Zbigniew Kosla (Kielce),
Wieslaw Wojcik (Koszalin),
Janusz Lewandowski (Lublin),
Miroslaw Drzewiecki (Lodz),
Pawel Abramski (Olsztyn),
Marek Samborski (Opole),
Jerzy Orlowski (Piotrkow),
Eugeniusz Aleksandrowicz (Plock-Skierniewice),
Wladyslaw Reichelt (Poznan),
Andrzej Hardy (Sosnowiec),
Andrzej Arendarski (capital city),
Wojciech Wardecki (Szczecin),
Jacek Merkel (Torun-Wloclawek),
Miroslaw Sosnicki (Walbrzych),
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Warsaw),
Pawel Piskorski (Warsaw),
Jacek Kurczewski (Warsaw),
Zenon Michalak (Wroclaw),
Andrzej Zarebski (Zielona Gora-Leszno),
Waldemar Pelc (Krakow).

People's Accord

Piotr Krutul (Bialystok),
Stefan Krol (Bydgoszcz),
Antoni Furtak (Gdansk),
Waclaw Niewiarowski (Gorzow-Pila),
Andrzej Wojtyla (Kalisz),
Tadeusz Kowalczyk (Kielce),
Ireneusz Niewiarowski (Konin),
Tadeusz Wojcik (Krosno-Przemysl),
Roman Wierzbicki (Lublin),
Zygmunt Berdychowski (Nowy Sacz),
Jozef Gutowski (Ostroleka),
Wieslaw Janowski (Ostroleka),
Stanislaw Adamowicz (Piotrkow),
Tadeusz Szymczak (Plock-Skierniewice),
Henryk Bak (Radom),
Jozef Fraczek (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Henryk Suchora (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),

Slawomir Hardej (Siedlce),
Gabriel Janowski (Siedlce),
Stefan Szankowski (Siedlce),
Arthur Balazs (Szczecin),
Feliks Klimczok (Torun-Wloclawek),
Stanislaw Czochonski (Zamosc).

Solidarity

Stanislaw Wasik (Bielsko-Biala),
Jan Rulewski (Bydgoszcz),
Bogdan Borusewicz (Gdansk),
Jan Kulas (Gdansk),
Tadeusz Jedynak (Gliwice),
Stanislaw Sobanski (Gorzow-Pila),
Tadeusz Lewandowski (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Antoni Tyrakowski (Kalisz),
Alojzy Pietrzyk (Katowice),
Elzbieta Saferowicz (Katowice),
Zbigniew Ladosz (Konin),
Edward Mueller (Koszalin),
Stanislaw Baran (Krosno-Przemysl),
Stanislaw Weglorz (Lublin),
Marek Markiewicz (Lodz),
Jerzy Niczyperowicz (Olsztyn),
Maria Zoltowska (Plock-Skierniewice),
Marek Zielinski (Poznan),
Barbara Fraczek (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg),
Slawomir Panek (Sosnowiec),
Pawel Kowalczyk (Szczecin),
Waldemar Bartosz (Kielce),
Jozef Dolata (Wroclaw).

Polish Party of Beer Lovers

Jerzy Dziewulski (Bielsko-Biala),
Tomasz Holc (Gdansk),
Tomasz Bankowski (Gliwice),
Tomasz Brach (Jelenia Gora-Legnica),
Andrzej Czernecki (Katowice),
Krzysztof Ibisz (Lodz),
Andrzej Zakrzewski (Olsztyn),
Cezary Urbaniak (Poznan),
Slawomir Chabinski (Sosnowiec),
Leszek Bubel (Walbrzych),
Janusz Rewinski (Warsaw),
Zbigniew Eysmont (Wroclaw),
Marek Kloczko (Zielona Gora-Leszno).

Christian Democracy

Stefan Pastuszewski (Bydgoszcz),
Wladyslaw Staniuk (Koszalin),
Jozef Hormanowicz (Gorzow-Pila),
Tadeusz Lasocki (Ostroleka),
Henryk Rospara (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg).

Party of Christian Democrats

Janusz Steinhoff (Gliwice),
Anna Knysok (Katowice),
Pawel Laczkowski (Poznan),
Wieslaw Klisiewicz (Tarnow).

Union for Real Politics

Andrzej Sielanczyk (Katowice),
Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Poznan),
Lech Pruchno-Wroblewski (Warsaw).

Polish Western Union

Kazimierz Wilk (Bielsko-Biala),
Danuta Wierzbicka (Gliwice),
Janina Kraus (Katowice),
Ryszard Bogusz (Koszalin).

German Minority

Georg Brylka (Czestochowa),
Jan Fabian (Gliwice),
Edmund Bastek (Katowice),
Bruno Kozak (Opole),
Henryk Krol (Opole),
Helmut Pazdzior (Opole).

Labor Solidarity

Aleksander Malachowski (Bialystok),
Piotr Czarnecki (Krakow),
Wojciech Kwiatkowski (Torun-Wloclawek),
Ryszard Bugaj (Warsaw).

The Party X

Waldemar Jedryka (Koszalin),
Kazimierz Cholistowski (Olsztyn),
Antoni Czajka (Torun-Wloclawek).

Movement for the Autonomy of Silesia

Kazimierz Switon (Katowice),
Pawel Musiol (Gliwice).

Bydgoszcz National Unity List

Wojciech Mojzesowicz (Bydgoszcz).

Democratic Party

Jan Switka (Rzeszow-Tarnobrzeg).

Election Committee of the Orthodox

Eugeniusz Czykwin (Bialystok).

Union of Podhale Residents

Andrzej Gasienica-Makowski (Nowy Sacz).

People's Election Accord "Piast"

Wladyslaw Zabinski (Tarnow).

Give Us a Chance

Stanislaw Kocjan (Szczecin).

For Great Poland and Poland

Wieslawa Ziolkowska (Poznan).

Union of Great Poland and Lubusz Residents

Jozef Bak (Zielona Gora-Lesno).

Krakow Coalition for Solidarity With the President

Mieczyslaw Gil (Krakow).

Union of Women Against the Hardship of Life

Bozena Gaj (Krakow).

Democratic Social Movement

Zbigniew Bujak (Warsaw).

Election Assessment: Extreme Right, Left Win

92EP0080A Lodz GLOS PORANNY in Polish
2-3 Nov 91 p 4

[Interview with Prof. Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, director, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, by Teresa Kwasniewska; place and date not given: "The Third Road? After the Elections"]

[Text] [Kwasniewska] Sir. The voters have made their choice. How is it to be interpreted? As a win or as a loss?

[Wnuk-Lipinski] This is hard to answer unequivocally. Because there are both winners and losers. Or rather, the stock of some is rising and of others falling. Speaking most generally, I view the election results as pointing to political polarization, with the moderate center, which I view chiefly as the Democratic Union and the Liberals, suffering a defeat and with the extremists on the left and on the right ending up as the winners.

[Kwasniewska] That despite the fact that the Democratic Union won more votes than any other party?

[Wnuk-Lipinski] Yes, and I am basing my judgment on the fact that preelection polls predicted a greater percentage voting in favor of the Democratic Union and the Liberals, but just before the elections that percentage shrank. On the other hand those voting for the post-Communist and right-of-center groupings had been very energetically mobilized. This polarization is particularly evident among blue-collar workers. On the one hand they voted under the slogan, "Commune, come back!" and on the other they voted for the more rightist groupings, forming the electorate for the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland].

I fear that this is searching for yet another utopia or for a return to the former utopia. But then again, we cannot discuss this in more general categories; we cannot generalize, because this concerns a small part of the overall electorate. Still, that part is significant given the present alignment of political forces.

[Kwasniewska] Also telling seems to be the fact that a large segment of the public did not vote at all, does it not?

[Wnuk-Lipinski] Well, precisely. The fact that the first free elections attracted only 40 percent of eligible voters is saddening. But generally speaking, in any country some people have no interest at all in politics and do not vote, which should be viewed as something natural. When the political scene is stabilized, with only several "actors" [political parties] thereon, rather than with 15 or so as in

our country, it is of no great importance if even fewer than 50 percent of the public fail to vote. For example, in the United States presidents are elected by one-third of the electorate and no one questions the validity of these elections. This differentiation in the number of persons who avoid politics is to some extent a result of the "professionalization" of politics. If a class of professional politicians develops, then the number of those who refrain from voting increases. And this does not mean at all that the political structures emerging from elections based on such voter turnouts are any less legitimate.

[Kwasniewska] Let us rather worry about those who had deliberately refrained from voting.

[Wnuk-Lipinski] That exactly is the principal problem. I think that those who had refrained from voting wanted thereby to express their attitude to what is happening at present. They can be divided into two categories: those unable to find within the broad variety of political parties any one with which they could identify—and here I want to offer the paradoxical proposition that to some people such a large number of parties was an obstacle to making the right choice. That is because voting makes sense when one believes in the validity of one's choice. The other category of nonvoters consisted of those who were thereby protesting against the current direction of changes, and against the political establishment.

[Kwasniewska] Following the presidential election in 1990 the public was accused of being "stupid" owing to its voting patterns [a reference to the popularity of Tyminski]. And now a leading politician (who nota bene stood for the elections) declared that "the public is the loser" by having thus divided its votes, that the results of the elections will turn out to be tragically negative for Poland.

That is the kind of thing said only by those who think they are the sole possessors of truth about the right road for Poland to follow. A sentiment like that is all the more dangerous to the entire democratic system if it is felt by a politician. That is because a democratic system consists of many options. There exists a logic of support that is decisive—as a basic criterion—to which of these options is selected as the path of development or of life of the society.

And I think that this is yet another paradox of our transformation, consisting in that freedom and the free market cannot be decreed from the top. At most, the conditions for their growth can be thus created. But, I repeat, everything must be based on the logic of social support. If that support is lacking, then the direction of the liberal reforms becomes threatened.

[Kwasniewska] You are presenting a rather catastrophic vision.

[Wnuk-Lipinski] I don't want to do so. It may be that a third road ["between socialism and capitalism"] does exist, but so far mankind has not found it. Or perhaps Poland will become the first country in which such a road will be successful and it will turn out that all the existing economic or political doctrines are outlived? Perhaps.... A large segment of the society would favor the third road, but

the knowledge so far indicates that it would be doomed to failure. The criterion of truth can be only this. Or perhaps there will be no failure?

[Kwasniewska] How do you then view the chances of the newly elected Sejm? Optimistically?

[Wnuk-Lipinski] Calmly, I think, above all. We all are learning democracy, the fact that there exist different rationales and that everything boils down to social support. The structure of this newly elected Sejm indeed threatens to paralyze governing. The political strength of parties with extremist, antiliberal, and antimarket views has grown. That is incontestable, but as to whether their views prove influential, that is yet to be seen.

In theory, it is politically possible for a government to be formed which will explore and follow that third road on the basis of a coalition of "anti-Balcerowicz" political options. Then it should be wished success, because it would be in the interest of us all if the transition to a market economy could be accomplished "scot-free." But that is utopia. Except that of course this is at present not convincing and of no political importance. It is the coming failure of such attempts that will be of political importance. Then we shall return to our starting point. Apparently our development has to follow a spiral pattern....

[Kwasniewska] And thus we would get our fingers burned before we learn to dread the fire.

[Wnuk-Lipinski] Unfortunately, yes.

Overview of Economy for First Three Quarters

92EP0059D Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish
23 Oct p 1

[Article by Antoni Kowalik: "The Economy After Three Quarters: What Is Enduring, What Is Changeable"]

[Text] The decline in enterprise production and activity leading to lower profits and problems with beefing up the budget, growing unemployment, but also the positive foreign trade balance and higher turnovers with EEC countries, the slower rate of inflation, development in the private sector, and higher real wages and pensions—these are the tendencies that may be observed from the economic results after the last three quarters as published by GUS [Central Office of Statistics]. Presumably the next two months will not change things very much. This means that it is also possible to forecast the year's end. These results, however, do not yield an unequivocal answer to the question: Is the economy still plunged in recession, or has the hoped-for "rebound from the bottom" already taken place?

According to the GUS information, the average monthly rate of price increase was lower this year than last year, showing a decline from 12.9 percent to 4.3 percent. In July and August the lowest monthly increases in the prices of consumer goods and services for several years were noted. In September, however, the rate of increase of these prices accelerated.

The purchasing power of personal income during the last three quarters was higher than for the same period last year. During the first half, real household income was higher than for the same period last year. The income of pension and annuity families and of wage-earner families rose significantly, while the income of peasant families declined. Average real wages, for the first three quarters of 1991, rose by 8.5 percent, compared with the average level of wages for three quarters, while the real wages of pensioners rose by 21 percent.

Compared with the previous year, industrial production has declined significantly. This is related to the production increase that occurred in the third quarter. During a period of three quarters in 1991, production in the machine and metallurgical industries showed the greatest drop by comparison with the same period last year. Likewise the decline in light industry and the chemical industry was severe. Only in the food processing industry was there a notable increase.

The financial situation of enterprises was significantly worse than last year. Ratios characterizing financial results in the first six months worsened from month to month; recently, however, they have somewhat stabilized. Over the expanse of these quarters, enterprise profitability has systematically declined, and the number of enterprises showing a net profit has also dropped.

During the last nine-month period, a significantly higher import volume has been noted over a year ago. The foreign trade balance, however, is positive. During this entire period, higher turnovers with EEC countries have been maintained compared with a year ago. These constituted over half of all trade. In the public sector, the number of state enterprises and companies in which state legal persons has a share has declined. The number of companies of the state treasury and municipal enterprises has risen.

There has been a significant increase in the number of organizational units in the private sector. The number of private companies has risen by one-third; the number of joint-venture companies has doubled; the number of cooperatives has grown. In six sectors of the national economy (agriculture not included), 44.8 percent of those employed work in the private sector. The share of the private sector in investment outlays has declined from 41.3 percent in the first six months of last year to 40.4 percent during the same period this year. The decline of outlays in agriculture has had a decisive impact on this index; outlays in the nonagricultural private sector rose.

The data cited in the analysis attests to great changeability, both of tendencies and of the indexes which characterize the state of the economy. In answer to the question posed at the beginning of this article regarding the recession, as was stressed at the conference at GUS, it is possible to uncover data supporting totally opposite theses. Phenomena of a more enduring nature which will have an impact on the economy in the coming year undoubtedly include the poor financial condition of enterprises, which means a weakened bolstering of the budget. This is a consequence of the insufficient restructuring of industry

and of the lack of the adaptation of enterprises to the new conditions. These changes spread out over time signify a further increase in unemployment. Changes in the directions of foreign trade and the development of the private sector are also enduring changes.

Trade With USSR Seen To Be Promising

92EP0059F Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 14 Oct p II

[Article by Danuta Walewska: "Polish-Soviet Trade: The Optimistic Variant"]

[Text] Georgij Shchukin, USSR Embassy trade adviser in Warsaw, is of the opinion that trade between our countries is in no way a disaster, especially if we compare the decline in turnovers with the same turnovers with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There it is truly a tragedy. The production decline in the Soviet Union, above all, is responsible for the tremendous decline in turnovers and for the fact that recent trade agreements that we succeeded in signing in no way compare with last year's indicator lists.

On the other hand, this year's turnovers have not turned out to be that bad. Contracts that have been signed exchange more goods than are itemized on the indicator lists. Of course, however, a contract compared with the reality is like a chorus of wishful thinking versus wish fulfillment. This is what has happened in the case of Polish-Soviet trade as well.

Moreover, according to adviser Shchukin, the press does not report all contracts and their implementation. Within the framework of barter agreements, the Russians have imported 100,000 tons of sugar from Poland, 3 billion packages of cigarettes, approximately 15,000 tons of powdered milk, 12,000 tons of meat, and 12,000 tons of butter. Meanwhile, Poland has imported crude oil from the USSR. Other transactions include cotton for grain and medicine for natural gas, among others. The value of all of these taken together would be \$4.6-5 billion. Compared with \$11 billion last year, this is an enormous decline, but it is feared that the decline will be still more drastic.

A contractual arrangement between farmers and the government for potatoes also was initiated as a result of the agreement signed last Saturday. "I do not know, however, whether we will be able to buy these potatoes," said the adviser. "We are prepared to pay \$72-75 per ton. Since this transaction will take place based on short-term credit, farmers would like to negotiate a price in excess of \$80-85 per ton. We cannot accept this. Today potatoes on the market cost approximately \$60 per ton—for example, in Ireland—and not on credit. On the other hand, if we sign an agreement with Poland, we must use the suppliers who are indicated to us by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries."

The Soviet adviser considers the interbank understanding, which was also signed last Saturday, to be very important. "If it was signed, this is a great opportunity that trade will now take off. There will no longer be any bank obstructions and the example of clearing of accounts may become a

model for future trade with individual republics. For the idea of 'supply today, pay today' is still very unrealistic."

Adviser Shchukin also has good news for the Polish shipyards. The Soviet government has found the money to pay in part for the ships they ordered—specifically it has \$40 million. It is looking for the dollars for the remainder and will probably find them. Meanwhile, future contracts with Polish shipyards will have to be based on other terms, for no one in the world today sells ships for cash, but on long-term credit. The Korean and Japanese shipyards are proposing credit over a 10-to-12-year period with a long grace period.

"I believe that we shall succeed in improving the results of trade during the next year," says the adviser. The fact that the political will exists to maintain these contacts fills him with optimism. He does not see the possibility for normal (i.e., for cash) trade, but rather for barter and clearing. He envisages primarily the Russians and the White Russians as partners for Poland, as well as the Baltic republics. He notes a certain difficulty in the fascination of the Soviet market with fancy packaging of goods from the West, to which Polish packaging cannot compare. In his opinion, it is not only tradition that favors trade with Poland but also common sense and good lines of communication linking Poland and the Soviet Union. There is hope for very good results from the visit of Premier Silayev, who has been invited to Poland.

Commission Founded for Cooperation With Italy

92EP0059C Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 23 Oct p I

[Article by Danuta Walewska: "Polish-Italian Cooperation: Capitalism With a Human Face"]

[Text] With the blessing of the episcopate and with support from the Belvedere Palace, an Italian-Polish commission was created on 22 October in Warsaw. The purpose of the commission will be to study and promote economic, social, and cultural relations. The chairman from the Italian side is Prof. Luigi Crespi, adviser to Prime Minister Andreotti. Minister Slawomir Siwek is chairman from the Polish side. Minister Siwek cautioned at the conference that he does not treat this activity as related to the function he is currently performing.

The Polish side of the commission has nine more members: Witold Chodakiewicz and Kazimierz Kraska (Ministry of Transport and Maritime Management), Karol Krajewski (Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry), Jerzy Zdrzalka (Ministry of Land Use Management and Construction), and Stanislaw Padykula and George W. Dembinski. Members on the Italian side include: Silvio Di Virgilio (Ministry of Public Works), Angelo Balducci (public works inspector for the region of Latium), and Mario Risca (Ministry of Transport).

The Italians presented this new cooperation as good contact between the Polish and Italian Christian Democrats. Minister Siwek said that he is interested above all in

obtaining the largest possible number of investments for Poland's "eastern wall." A special foundation will be created for this region. If the government is not in a position to do this, then obviously it will have to receive aid for it.

The minister envisages cooperation primarily in three fields: agriculture, agricultural processing, and construction. If Italian capital expressed a desire to invest in the economic sphere in Mazowsze (the participation of Cargo Modlin in construction is not excluded) then that is also a possibility.

The foundation still does not have money. The Italian delegation came to Poland at its own expense. Meanwhile, Minister Siwek presumes that he will have to pay for renting the hall in the Marriott Hotel for the deliberations. While the Polish side is trying to get across the idea that it wants economic cooperation above all, Prof. Crespi stressed that the broadening of Christian values will also be important. "We cannot allow imperialistic capitalism, with its lack of respect for the rights of man, to arise upon the ruins of communism," he said.

The next meeting of the commission will be held in about six weeks. It will be devoted to technical problems and to a discussion of specific projects.

Rising Cost of Beets Raises Sugar Price

92EP0059A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 23 Oct p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "A Record Short Campaign: There Is Less Sugar, So It Is More Expensive"]

[Text] During the last period sugar prices rose sharply. Jerzy Kruszynski, chairman of the Sugar Industry Council, does not believe the price increase to be excessive, because it corresponds more or less to the increase in sugar beet procurement prices.

Last year, at sugar beet procurement prices that were 30 percent lower, the selling price of sugar ruled at a level that approximated this year's level, i.e., it stood at approximately 5 million zlotys [Z] per ton. However, it then dropped last year to Z4 million, while this year in some sugar plants it is Z5.5 million, and is not expected to drop. This results from the rules of the market game. Since the beet harvest will be approximately 4 million tons lower and sugar production will decline by about 600,000 tons, to a level of 1.4 million tons (this exactly corresponds to the domestic requirement), there is no reason to lower the prices of this product. On the London market, the price of sugar is currently \$285 per ton, but the domestic sugar industry is protected from foreign competition by a 40-percent tariff and a 20-percent tax. Besides, the world price of sugar is, to a certain extent, an artificial price. It reflects not so much production costs as the export policy of individual states that can afford export subsidies. We experienced the benefits of selling sugar to foreign customers last year when we had to export 600,000 tons of sugar, subsidizing this "business deal" with approximately Z600 billion.

Confirming the thesis of subsidizing the export of sugar, Director Jerzy Kruszynski gives the selling price of sugar in EEC countries as nearly \$1 per kilogram [kg]. Thus, Polish sugar plants could set it at Z11,000 per kg. But then what would the retail price be and what would be the demand volume? For this year's procurement of raw material for sugar plants, credit in the amount of more than Z3 billion was needed. The Ministry of Finance decided that half of this credit should come from the Food Industry Bank and from three of the sugar industry's own banks that were established a year ago: the Poznan Sugar Industry Development Bank, the Eastern Sugar Industry Bank in Lublin, and the Wroclaw Sugar Industry Bank. The interest rate on raw materials procurement is set at 0.6 of the percentage rate of refinancing credit. The procurement price of sugar beets ranges from Z200,000-250,000 per ton. By now, approximately half of the raw material has been procured, and about 50 percent of this has been processed. The sugar content of the beets, measured by the polarization method, is somewhat higher than it was last year. In sugar plants that utilize the services of the bank in Wroclaw this content is 16.75 percent.

How this year's procurement price of beets is impacting the production decisions of farmers is unknown at present. Competitive farmers make decisions motivated by immediate profitability. Farmers who think in terms of the future understand that beet cultivation is also significant for agrotechnology.

This year's sugar production campaign will not last long. Some sugar plants expect that the raw material will be barely enough for 40 days and that beet processing will end in November. Most likely, the campaign will not extend beyond the Christmas holidays in any sugar plant. A shorter campaign also represents fewer opportunities for losses. This is particularly so since there will not be very much from which to lose, since over one-fourth less sugar is being produced.

Record Year for Telecommunications Predicted

92EP0059D Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA*
(*ECONOMY AND LAW* supplement) in Polish
16 Oct p II

[Article by Wieslawa Mazur: "Before the Telecommunications Leap: It Is Easier To Place a Call Across the Ocean Than To Call Prague"]

[Text] Despite the fact that telephones in our country, especially in Warsaw, function very badly, this will definitely not be a bad year for telecommunications. Perhaps we shall even hear someday that in 1991 our standards rebounded from the bottom and we managed to move from lagging behind in European telecommunications to achieving a decent, civilized status. Perhaps.

In many ways, this year will be a record one for telecommunications. As never before, new customers are subscribing. Data from the middle of October records 164,000 new subscribers (the rate compared with a year ago exceeds 150 percent). For the first time, the needs of rural areas, where 37,000 telephones were placed this year, have been

taken more seriously (a growth rate of 200 percent!). However, the most important thing is that there has not been diversion from the designated course of telecommunications developmental strategy; this should soon yield significant results.

According to the head of the Ministry of Communications, Jerzy Wiktor Slezak, there is a chance for a telephone boom, which will make possible the hooking up into the network of a million phones in the course of a year—just as it is in France or Spain. According to the ministry's plan, approximately 10-12 million telephones should be installed in Poland over the course of 10 years. At present we have fewer than about 3.5 million and 2.3 million people are waiting for a phone. About 7,000 villages lack any kind of telephone communication with the world.

As it turns out, sometimes there really is no evil that does not have its positive aspect. We are embarking upon making up our telecommunications delays at a time when it is possible to take advantage of the experience of other countries that are much more advanced than we.

The telecommunications development strategy is like building a building from the top, from the roof down. This is not always understood. In this case, it is building from international communications and not from the unpopular and neglected local network. It is difficult to explain to people why it is easy to call across the ocean today but one cannot place a call from Ochota to Warsaw's Praga district. But the developmental opportunities of other sections of telecommunications networks may depend upon telephones working efficiently in transatlantic calls, for example.

It is for this reason that in the fall of this year, an automatic international Komertel digital central international exchange was installed. It is small and accommodates only 2,000 numbers. In the summer of 1991, a universally accessible international automatic digital central exchange with 3,400 incoming and outgoing connections was activated in Warsaw by the American firm AT&T (Komertel is equipped with only 70 connections). This new central exchange is merely a fragment of a far-reaching developmental strategy for telecommunications in our country. Its activation was accompanied by an increase in the number of international connections thanks to a laser-powered underwater cable that was recently put into operation. This cable runs from Copenhagen through Bornholm to Koszalin.

The digital Koszalin-Warsaw radio line is an extension of this cable. At the same time, the flow capacity/transfer function of the satellite station installed in Psary was increased by equipping it with equipment making possible the introduction of a modern system of digital teletransmission and with a digital artery that links the station in Psary with the international central exchange in Warsaw. Thanks to them, since 12 August we have had automatic telephone connections from Poland to the United States for the first time in the national public network.

Nor are there any special problems in speaking by phone with someone who is in Germany, Holland, or Switzerland. But truly, the "world will be ours" when the next two strategic international central exchanges are opened next year and at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 in Katowice, where the German Siemens is in operation, and in Poznan, equipped by the French Alcatel-Cit.

Unfortunately, all this does not mean that it will be immediately possible to effortlessly call from one Polish city to another, or from one Warsaw district to another. As far as the capital is concerned, the ministry expects the difficulties to end in 1992. The Warsaw network, in which there will be eight transit central exchanges, has been modernized thanks to credit from the Spanish Government: By 1995 it is slated to have the capability of adding 2 million new telephones.

With regard to intercity communications, a basic improvement is to take place when 12 automatic transit central exchanges scattered among major cities are put into operation more or less in two or, at the most, three years. Like the international central exchanges, these will be joined together by a network of lines using laser-powered digital cables and digital radio lines in various possible ways. The investments will be implemented with the use of World Bank credit (\$210 million).

Poland is an interesting market for many firms that produce telecommunications equipment. These firms are battling fiercely to install their equipment in Poland. We must take advantage of these opportunities. We are trying to choose the best and least expensive firms that not only want to sell to us but also want to manufacture here.

Justice Minister on Combating Corruption

92BA0114A Bucharest *CURIERUL NATIONAL*
in Romanian 31 Oct 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Justice Minister Mircea Ionescu Quintus by Ralu Filip; place and date not given: "War on Corruption"]

[Text] [Filip] There is a lot of talk about corruption, but never anything concrete. Do you have an approximate picture of the phenomenon?

[Ionescu Quintus] Yes, I do have such a picture, not from the perspective of my current position, but from that of a citizen who over the years ran against every corruption obstacle. The idea rooted among the populace is that in our country you cannot accomplish anything if you don't pay, if you don't have connections, or if you don't know influential people. This idea has discredited into oblivion the concept of social justice and legality; at the same time it has obliterated people's faith in the authority of the judiciary. So it is from this angle that I approach the problem of corruption which, as far as I can tell, is reaching dangerous levels.

[Filip] How dangerous?

[Ionescu Quintus] According to my reports—as yet unverified but numerous enough to have to be considered—securing certain naturally deserved rights always hinged on material sops. I'm talking about the allocation of commercial space, housing, permits, and even court decisions, in which connection I'm thinking particularly of adoptions. Consequently, I am pursued by an image of extremely widespread corruption in our society, especially now, in my job, which obligates me to take an attitude against it.

[Filip] How widespread is corruption along the vertical axis?

[Ionescu Quintus] I am a jurist, so I cannot allow myself to make evaluations without evidence. We are sensing, I am sensing this condition of corruption, but I have to identify it and relate it to the actual culpability of specific persons. This, in fact, is the action that the government has decided to initiate when it declared "war on corruption."

[Filip] What does this "war on corruption" actually mean?

[Ionescu Quintus] It means finding better and swifter legal means of uncovering cases of corruption and those guilty of it, and immediately sending them to court. For this purpose we intend to modify certain articles of the code of penal procedure in order to establish an urgent procedure for bringing this kind of illegal actions to trial. At the same time, we want to focus the attention of the bodies in charge of penal investigation and trial on the special responsibility they carry for uncovering and punishing crimes such as taking and paying bribes, influence peddling, trafficking of all kinds, and attempts on public morals.

[Filip] Do you find the use of Law No. 18, a specifically communist law, justified in this "war on corruption"?

[Ionescu Quintus] Evidently not. Law No. 18 was already amended in 1990 and is still in effect. No one ordered that it should not be applied or, the opposite, that it should be implemented more extensively. This law belongs to the

communist legal system and is applied in that spirit, whereby the presumption of innocence was replaced by the presumption of guilt. I mean to say that a citizen under investigation was obligated to prove source of income, while normally the prosecution has to produce proof of illicit sources. Currently such a reversal of the elementary principles of law is no longer conceivable. We are studying a new law based on the principles of a state of law, that may not in any way hurt private initiative and opportunities of securing unlimited earnings by honest means. We proceed from the idea that a country is rich when its people are rich.

[Filip] What do you intend to do to stop the corruption prevailing in the judiciary?

[Ionescu Quintus] The very first day I came into office I pointed out to my staff that directly or indirectly the Justice Ministry must become the ministry of justice, and justice cannot be achieved unless the laws are correctly implemented, which in the case of the magistrates requires professional skills and personal honesty. Any deviation will incur full punishment for those guilty. On the other hand, recently we received many notifications, many of them anonymous, concerning magistrates who were inappropriate both from the viewpoint of political antecedents and honesty. I will have to look into all these warnings, except for the anonymous ones, and take due measures in keeping with the findings. At the same time, I am faced with a shortage of judges, which means that I will have to find competent and moral people to fulfill these extremely responsible duties in place of those who may be removed.

[Filip] Do you not think that changes are also needed in the structure of the Ministry?

[Ionescu Quintus] When Mr. Babiuc passed the office on to me he told me that he had made extensive and substantial changes in the Ministry apparatus. This week's avalanche of very, very urgent problems did not allow me to find out whether these changes included the removal of persons compromised by their activities under the old regime, but I see it as my duty to carry out this operation in the immediate future. I'm not thinking of a witch hunt, but in the cases in which the past is no longer compatible with the present I will proceed to make the necessary changes.

[Filip] Minister, last week our newspaper carried portions from a report addressed to the prime minister concerning serious abuses committed at the Ministry of Youth and Sports. What should be done?

[Ionescu Quintus] The general prosecutor should take action ex officio and order an investigation of the case by the Special Investigations Bureau.

[Filip] What is your view on cooperation with the press?

[Ionescu Quintus] Whenever the press writes about or refers to any wrong court ruling or abuse committed by a magistrate I will immediately have the case checked by court inspectors, who are expected to report their findings to me in writing within 24 hours. Regardless of the outcome of the investigation, I will communicate it to the newspaper in question, because I believe that having things brought to our attention by the public is a help in our work.

Slovene-Italian Border Problems Reopened

92BA0120C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Nov 91 p 6

[Article by Ana Kalc Hafner: "'Opportunity Makes a Thief,' and There Will Be Plenty of Opportunities for a Cheap Clearance Sale"]

[Text] Our neighbors are reopening the question of Slovenia's western border. In view of the initiative for revising or supplementing the Osimo accords, it would be worthwhile to recall several facts that warn us of the possible intentions and primarily of the absurdity of any illusions.

The national question began to grow more acute at the beginning of this century. A secret agreement was signed in London on 26 April 1915 that promised Italy the annexation of Istria, Slovensko Primorje with Gorica, Notranjska, and a large part of Dalmatia in return for Italy's entry into the war against Austria. Through acquisition of those territories Italy tried to secure strategic control over Yugoslavia. Italian diplomacy cited the London secret agreement, and in Rapallo it achieved the signing of a treaty that severed from their own people about half a million Slovenes and Croats. Between the wars, thousands of Slovene and Croatian patriots fled from persecution in those regions, and many of them were forcibly relocated by the Italian authorities to new jobs in the interior of Italy. We did not record the facts about that exodus, and we were not able or did not know how to cash in on them in the negotiations after World War II.

This only invites comparison with the emigration of Istrians during the decade from 1945 to 1955, about which we also do not have accurate data, or at least they are not available to us. From the attached table one could conclude that the figures cited by Italian extremists are only somewhat exaggerated. Regardless of the figures, it is undoubtedly true that the emigration from Istria was harmful to both sides. It was harmful to the Slovene minority in Italy because the new arrivals had all the advantages in employment, and thus displaced the indigenous population, and primarily because of the planned settlement of the refugees in what were, so to speak, completely Slovene areas, where the Slovenes have lost or are losing their majority in the local administrations.

Both sides were consequently affected. The London memorandum and the Osimo accords were a compromise that made several years of peaceful coexistence possible. After the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the Italian minority has opened the issue of Istrian autonomy, which for the time being is not precisely defined. The confirmation of a free trade zone would contribute the most to the true economic and other advancement of Trieste and its hinterlands, which include Istria. Both sides have rejected such a solution. Now we are being offered an autonomy which would be exclusively at the expense of the Slovene and Croatian sides. The Slovene state does not have any interest in renouncing, even if only partially, its authority in part of its own territory, and moreover the only part that allows it access to the sea. Certainly today we may finally venture to admit to each other that we are only talking about interests.

In any case, the protection of minorities is mutually advantageous. It is also not good for the majority if a wrong is done to a member of the minority people, because that wrong is often easier to recover from than to forget, and thus debts from the past are passed on to future generations. The protection of minorities can only be dictated, even in democratic states. Officially, we do not consent to the principle of reciprocity, but it is imposed on sober politicians on its own accord in the world which is based on market relations and liberal politics.

The Slovene state is living through a critical period for preserving its national identity and territorial integrity. Merchants will try to use money to acquire what they used to acquire in different times and circumstances by means of force and secret diplomacy. Will Slovene politicians want and be able to insure us against political tricks and a cheap clearance sale which would benefit only individuals or individual groups, but bring the majority at most a short-term and fictitious easing of their material difficulties?

On the official level, the aspiration for conciliation is obvious both in Slovenia and in Italy, and the unexpected reversals in Rome's attitude toward Slovene independence inspire hope that the demand for revision of the border will really remain only the extremists' demand. But they say that "opportunity makes a thief," and in the kind of difficulties that are threatening us, there will be plenty of opportunities for a cheap clearance sale. It will also depend on us ordinary citizens, on our readiness for temporary sacrifices and on our endurance, whether we will be able to remain masters on our own territory and at the same time ensure all the rights of indigenous and other minorities, the rights that they are entitled to as equal citizens of Slovenia.

Recognition of Slovenia Expected in 2 Months

92BA0120B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Nov 91 p 6

["Excerpts" from an unattributed interview with Slovene Prime Minister Lojze Peterle reprinted from WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE; place and date not given: "Recognition of Slovenia in Two Months at the Latest"]

[Text] "I am convinced that the EC and Austria will recognize us in two months at the latest. Europe, in fact, is realizing what is really happening in the Balkans," stated Prime Minister Lojze Peterle in an interview by the Austrian [as published] weekly WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE.

On other topics he stated as follows:

Slovene passports: "Of course, there is no problem in printing our own passports. The problem is traveling with them. With our passports, we can now travel through half of Europe. That is de facto recognition. We are still waiting for formal recognition."

Patience: "We became used to being patient a long time ago. There were times when we could not even talk to Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis, for example. Now we can talk to everyone: with Mr. Mock, Mr. Genscher, Mr. Van den Broeck, every day or even several times a day."

The Hague Conference: "It is true that the peace conference's productivity and success could have been much greater. The conference has not stopped either the war in Croatia nor the economic war against Slovenia. Mediation in these two arenas has been unsuccessful. The conference has, however, played a certain security role and prevented the situation from being even worse than it really is."

The Yugoslav Army: "I do not believe that the Army would intervene in Slovenia again. There may be terrorist actions or air attacks, which active officers could carry out on their own account. In my opinion, there is no general danger."

The economic crisis: "We would still be much worse off if we had remained within Yugoslavia. The crucial thing is that Slovenia is no longer tied to Yugoslavia and can form its own policy. Of course, many problems will have to be solved. The Army has poisoned relations among the republics. The decline in trade with the remainder of Yugoslavia is really a big problem. Some enterprises are still shipping goods to the south, because they are convinced that in the long term those markets can be kept. I also think so, although there will be major attacks in the south; but the Slovene economy is dynamic and adaptable."

The preparations for independence: "Now it is possible to assert that too little was done with respect to preparations. The important thing, however, is primarily monetary independence, and we have achieved that. We have also already set up tax legislation. We will soon pass a law on turnover taxes. Altogether, we have proposed more than 100 laws to parliament."

Privatization: "That problem is particularly hard to solve in all of the countries of the former Eastern bloc, because it is opposed by many groups—primarily enterprise directors who would like to keep their privileges. Now the directors' group in parliament is preventing the passage of this law. It is hard to predict when the law will be passed, but I expect it will be within one month."

Sachs's role: "Mr. Sachs is a proponent of abrupt privatization. I am also in favor of taking rapid measures. It is not any less painful if we cut off a cat's tail piece by piece. In my opinion, it is better to cut it off all at once."

Employment: "In Slovenia we have a problem with fictitious employment. If we want to become internationally competitive, we also have to adopt international standards. Unemployment will certainly continue to grow, since according to our calculations there are 30 percent too many employees. As far as solving this problem is concerned, we are not talking about a shock program, but we are obviously against a gradual approach that could drag out the process of economic transformation indefinitely. That is why we are in favor of abrupt privatization. Of course, that will be the main shock for society. If we want to achieve something, however, we also have to pay for it."

The prince's stone: "The reactions to the representation of the prince's stone on the tolar surprised us a great deal,

because they were not professional. It came to light, however, what the prince's stone actually is. Everything has been clarified. If we were as sensitive as the Austrian Carinthians, we could also demand that the Lipizans, which undoubtedly came from Slovenia, be removed from Austrian banknotes. Every state obviously has the right to use its own symbols. The assumption that the prince's stone on our banknotes is supposed to mean territorial claims against Austria is a speculation of quite a special sort. I think that not even the Carinthians are taking this seriously. Of course, the situation and circumstances there are quite different. It was a purely political affair."

National, Christian Democrats Review Cooperation

92BA0120A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by Marko Pecauer: "Agreement of the National and Christian Democrats"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 7 Nov—The leadership of the SDZ-NDS [Slovene Democratic Alliance-National Democratic Party] met today with the leadership of the Slovene Christian Democrats. They presented to them the SDZ-NDS's program orientations, exchanged views on several current issues, and identified points in common and possibilities for further cooperation between the two parties.

As Dr. Rajko Pirnat stated, the SDZ-NDS is persisting in a national-democratic orientation; it will still be necessary to protect the people's interests and advantages, especially against Europe, where a capitalist liberal orientation prevails that views Europe as a melting-pot of peoples, whereas the National Democrats view it as a common home of peoples.

He also pointed out that Slovenia is still essentially a real-socialist society; the delay in privatization means a delay in social transformation and creation of the possibility of the theft of social property. He thought that the SDZ-NDS was at the center of DEMOS. Cooperation within it will still be necessary, since its goals have not yet been achieved. Those who have reservations about further cooperation are going back on their given word.

Lojze Peterle began by saying that the SKD [Slovene Christian Democratic Party] would find a basis for fruitful cooperation in the SDZ-NDS's program documents. Emphasis on the values of the people also seems appropriate to the Christian Democrats, although their program is based on the person as an individual. He also thought that Demos had not yet fulfilled its program, and that its parties could only fulfill the voters' confidence only by implementing what they had signed. Although independence has been realized, DEMOS is only now assuming the chief responsibility for the situation in Slovenia, the SKD president thought. Now, in fact, it has all the levers for governing in its hands. If DEMOS is not firm here, then—with the well-known blockade in the Assembly—only chaos can follow. In regard to the adoption of property legislation, Peterle said that it was necessary to make

use of all procedural and constitutional possibilities for removing the blockade; otherwise the government would have to say that it could not take responsibility, because it did not have any possibility of influencing the situation.

At the end, Dr. Rajko Pirnat answered a reporter's question by saying that they were not thinking about a union of the two parties, but that they were in favor of close cooperation.